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ABSTRACT

Since the Second World War, the international community has pursued measures to
safeguard civilians from certain threats and ensure the protection of basic human
liberties. It was the birth of human rights movements, which developed throughout
several decades and continues to expand, that slowly led to the formal recognition of
human security. This shift is recognized, in theoretical terms, as a movement from realist
security perspectives to the creation of a universal phenomenon that is altering standard
practices of international relations. One of the most significant changes has been the
development of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has created a jurisdiction
above that of nations, and independent from any organization. The United States has
launched an aggressive opposition campaign and has sought to undermine the Court to
protect its power. However, it is overlooking the benefits and significance of the global
collaboration and cooperation that is produced within such an unprecedented movement.
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Introduction

Security studies cannot be characterized as a stagnant field, and this has become
increasingly apparent in the past several decades. The nature of the global atmosphere
has been in the midst of what can be described as one of the most important shifts in
recent history, affecting political and social interaction at a global level. The days of
isolationist policies, those solely conscious of national interests and domestic
repercussions, are slowly fading. Thus, there has been a gradual shift in increasing
expectations of cooperation as a means of ensuring, at the very least, a reasonably
precarious world peace. Certainly the events of the twentieth century shook modem
consciousness, calling for an acknowledgment that the individual is the most fundamental
element of society and must be protected as such.

In other words, it is only through the

individual that the state acquires any meaning or legitimacy.

Consequently, the

international community has recognized that the perpetration of heinous crimes against
humanity can no longer be tolerated due to the magnanimity of the repercussions such
violence breeds.
Finally, despite numerous interruptions to progress, the result of decades of
struggle is coming to fruition as accountability for human rights becomes embedded in
the field of international relations. The efforts originally began with an awakening to the
fact that states cannot continue to abuse their own citizens just because they have the
power; rather, people's basic needs must be treated with respect. Country leaders and
political actors were gradually moving away from traditional international relations
practices, and were beginning to forge a new path for the future of the world. While
attempting to create an atmosphere that would not facilitate another scenario like World
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War II, the leading nations of the world had began establishing international
organizations. These agencies were created with the intent to share the burden of
reconstruction after the war, as well as generate greater tendencies for cooperation.
Those nations wielding the most power at the end of the Second World War recognized
that a war, of the magnitude that they had witnessed, impacts almost all players in a
negative manner. A poor international comrounity is not easily amenable to profitable
trades, while a stable global atmosphere allows more liberal spending since the money is
not invested in warfare. Throughout the years, international institutions were made all
the more effective due to the benefits provided by technology, allowing interaction to a
much higher degree than any other time in history. Of importance at this juncture is the
fact that globalization has played an instrumental role in aiding the development of
human rights. However, absent the interdependence that this 'humanitarian' movement
has created, accountability would not be achievable. This paper does not argue that
current measures are flawless, but that the significant steps that have been taken in the
right direction should not be ignored. The institutions and organizations that have formed
since the advent of the United Nations are gradually becoming more refined, and
consequently gain more power. It is vital to understand that the world is moving towards
uncharted territories, while simultaneously challenging state leaders to alter the
boundaries of an ancient and sacred political tenet: sovereignty.
The advent of international rights and notions of cooperation suggest that there is
a recent trend away from realism and towards universalism. Institutions like the
International Criminal Court (ICC) are certainly making significant headway towards an
accountable global society. The aim of this paper is to highlight the importance of an
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institution such as the ICC to the achievement of human security in light of the powers
granted to this Court.

This paper suggests that if threats to human security include the

threats posed by governments, as well as non-state actors, and if such threats are
universal in nature, then it stands to reason that there is a need for authority to prevent
and/or prosecute the perpetration of heinous crimes; and such authority should be
universal in nature as well. The International Criminal Court fulfills this very criterion.
In fact, the merging of human rights and human security, as well as the importance of
these concepts to the global community, is manifested through the inception of the ICC.
It is the essence of creating universal standards that are inescapable, fortifying the belief
that the safety of individuals trumps all other considerations.
The constant evolution of human rights has prevented the global community from
turning a blind eye to the injustices perpetrated throughout the world, and is continuing to
enforce basic principles of humanity on the international scene.

What began as an

attempt from state leaders to ensure stability within borders as a means of securing the
nation, turned into a cycle continuously gaining strength. The creation of organizations
acting independently of governments signalled the inclusion of civilians into political
arenas, coupled with the advancement of technology, facilitated the virtual inclusion of
many more people. The populace began gaining strength in numbers, and politicians
found themselves having to heed the desires of the masses. As such, the significance of
adhering to human rights began manifesting itself in positive forms, and human rights
developed into a much more complex and broader theory, that of human security.
While many hail the Court as a much-needed deterrent for heinous crimes, it still
remains contested by a few nations including the world's sole remaining superpower. It
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is thus imperative to examine the central features of ICC, as well as the effect of
American opposition on the efficiency and credibility of the Court as a tool for promoting
human security.

Issues of sovereignty are preventing the full participation of certain

countries, as they are wary of being on the receiving end of international institutions,
instead of being at the helm. Among other countries, there is a tendency for the United
States to prevent the sharing of power in order to maintain its position as influential
actors, often using might when reason fails. The efforts of some political actors to cling
to traditional methods are countered by the sweeping effects of globalization that
influence economic trade, social values, and technology.

The ease with which

information can be traded and communication effectuated provides considerable
incentive for many nations to enjoy cooperation with their counterparts. However, the
United States (US) still insists on operating unilaterally for self-serving interests, fearing
that too much cooperation will reduce their dominance on the international stage. It is
unfortunate that the American administration has undertaken such a strong campaign to
undermine the Court and hurt innocent citizens in its efforts. In doing so, the United
States is putting at risk many diplomatic relations and causing anger in the global
community, which is increasingly growing weary of abiding by the superpower's
demands.
Nonetheless, the face of the global community is changing and the challenges
threatening its peace are changing in nature as well. Traditionally, the biggest threats to
the peace of a country would come from the leader of another nation, and manifest itself
through conflict. Presently, the types of political actors have multiplied, and can come in
many shapes and forms.

Citizens have gained a more powerful voice through
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organizations centered on the advancement of particular causes. On the other hand,
citizens have also gained access to deadlier weaponry and the commission of terrorism
across continents has been facilitated by technological advancements. It is undeniable
that individuals are becoming more assertive in the contemporary era, whether through
positive means or negative ones, and the political climate must accommodate such a
change.

5

Chapter One: Shift in Security Studies
That the world and the people within it are evolving is confirmed by the
continuous spectrum of changes that drives humanity forward. Indeed, even in the early
stages of the twenty-first century, there is evidence of shifts taking place at the global
level that will ultimately shape the future of international relations. A particular concern
for state leaders has always been the security of their own nation, considered the essential
prerequisite to power and independence. Historically, sovereignty and strong defence
systems were recognized as key elements of state security; a view premised on the theory
that state autonomy is sacred and must be preserved at all cost. However, developments
over the past several decades have resulted in a gradual transfer of attention towards an
emerging, and increasingly important, view that human security is essential to
establishing national security. The movement can be attributed, in part, to the quick
development of transportation and communication technology.

This has, in turn,

contributed significantly to the movement of people and goods across borders, as well as
the creation of a network of interdependent economies. As a result, the security of one
nation is increasingly dependent on the security of other nations. Many scholars agree
that the shifts in security studies must also account for the changing role of sovereignty,
which has created an impediment to the participation of certain states.
Traditional notions of security derive meaning and focus from a realist
perspective of international relations that prioritizes the protection and preservation of
state sovereignty, often through military might. The realist framework that dominated
international relations for centuries viewed the state as the major actor, the referent

6

object, in the global arena, while placing great significance on territorial borders. 1 There
was noticeable reluctance by the global community to bother with the domestic issues of
countries, such as the treatment of people within nation-states.

In fact, diplomatic

alliances generally viewed such intrusion as a clear infringement on autonomy and
power.
There is a limitless power stmggles . . . but what drives
it is not an appetite for power in the human animal,
but a search for security that is forced by the anarchic
structure of the international system. 2
In this light, the international arena has largely been defined by the absence of
overarching leadership, meaning that ultimate power rests with the state and nothing can
rise above its supremacy. "If units are sovereign, their system of association must be
anarchy, and if the system is anarchic, its members must reject overarching
governments."3 Consequently, one can devise two broadly categorised options for the
global community: anarchy or world government.

Scholars, however, caution that

neither category will necessarily remove the issue of security from the international
agenda. Rather, it is suggested that the ultimate decision lies in choosing between these
two varied systems of security. 4
Academics that subscribe to realism, and its subcategories, suggest that the virtues
of anarchy are too strong to warrant a change in the system. The reasoning behind their
argument is that since "it is only the form, and not the problem", it is not an optimal

John Garnett, "Strategic Studies and its Assumptions," Contemporary Security Strategy I (1987): 1-12.
Glenn H. Snyder, "Mearsheimer's World- Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security,"
International Security 27, no. I (2002): 151.
3
Barry Buzan, "Security and the International Political System," in People, States, and Fear: The National
Security Problem in International Relations, ed. Barry Buzan (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 146.
4
Ibid.
1

2
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outcome to alter the existing structure. 5 Moreover, since anarchy has been a successful
system for a notable period of time, is already embedded into the fabric of the system,
and offers a great deal of diversity, its eradication will not resolve insecurity dilemmas. 6
These scholars further suggest that an anarchic system in the global arena provides the
sufficient checks and balances necessary to prevent extreme insecurity from sweeping the
entire international arena. 7 Additionally, even an anarchic world order requires the
creation of organizations that facilitate cooperation.

Such institutions are generally

created by stronger states as a means of controlling weaker states, thereby establishing a
hierarchic structure in the global community. As such, supporters of this 'self-help'
world order consider that the maintenance of such organizations would involve relative! y
low cost while promoting better relations between member-states. 8
An anarchic world order is said to be effective in that it provides efficient
deterrents for violence through the imposition of military might, while creating an
atmosphere of cooperation amongst countries that are continuously attempting to serve
their national interests. However, the absence of a central authority also means the
absence of an independent administrator to make final decisions and to whom complaints
can be made or appealed.

As a result, multilateral agreements and international

organizations begin to regulate certain areas of state behaviour.

The extent of the

authority granted to such an organization is largely dependent on the level of power and
control its members wish to bestow upon it, notably without a set of mechanisms to
enforce compliance.

Accordingly, states must partake in negotiations, testing each

5

Ibid, 149.
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Kenneth Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," in Theory oflnternational Politics, ed.
Kenneth Waltz (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 111.
6

8

other's limits and thus shaping the situation as it progresses. 9 Clearly, an exchange of
considerations occurs whereby each negotiating party attempts to secure its own interests
to the best of its abilities, and will continue to promote such individualistic interests. The
assumption within this framework is that defection from an agreement can result in the
use of force, which remains unregulated for the most part. 10 In the anarchic scenario, as
strictly defined by a lack of central leadership, struggles between the powerful emerge
and collectively dominate a system that is comprised of weaker states.

11

The security

issues that arise in this setting include the possibility of external intrusion into domestic
affairs, which is often met with hostility and contempt. As well, there is the likelihood
that increased violence will emanate from citizens that feel demeaned through foreign
presence and the local government will be powerless to exert control over its
population. 12 Undoubtedly, weaker states become pawns in the games of stronger states,
and are often left at a serious bargaining disadvantage due to their lack of military
capabilities. As such, the mere possibility of engaging in warfare with a significantly
stronger opponent is not a preferred outcome, thereby pressuring less powerful nations to
bend to the will of the powerful, and often act against their self-interest. This fact does
not raise grave concerns for the scholars of realism, based on the idea that it is natural for
the powerful to do as they please and, in turn, for the weak to submit as a means of
ensuring their survival.

Interestingly, there is very little importance granted to the

welfare of individuals, as the importance of citizens is disregarded in favour of the
security of borders.

Inhabitants of a nation are, in fact, key contributors to the

9

lbid.
Ibid, 113.
11
Buzan, "Security and the International Political System," 148.
12
lbid.
10

9

maintenance of security, however realists view the actions of governments as the only
point of interest.
The alternative to an anarchic system would be the establishment of a world
government. Though it can be created with various levels of control, and be structured in
a variety of forms, it would still inherently provide a forum to treat global issues in a
similar manner as domestic problems. The concerns under this school of thought revolve
around the distribution and concentration of power, as well as the amount of control
exercised with this power. 13 The concept of world authority must necessarily negate the
supremacy of governments, and focus on domestic affairs that may affect the welfare of
large groups of individuals. This global authority is granted greater powers as a means of
regulating matters in the administration of a country, in the event that abuse or improper
control is exercised. This type of universal leadership has yet to be implemented, and
thus there is a significant lack of empirical evidence available for data gathering.
However, the negative backlash of an anarchic system has made itself increasingly
apparent through the manifestation of uncontrolled violence, brought to international
attention through the advent of technology. It is this technology that has facilitated the
emancipation of many rights, made possible through the grouping of people with a
commonly identifiable problem. It is the ease with which people throughout the world
can garner support for a cause that empowers the needs of the citizenry as well as
strengthens their voice.
Absolute security is impossible to guarantee due to the possibility that one actor
may defect from convention and act inappropriately.

As a result, anarchy does not

necessarily provide the best forum to address the complex issues of the twenty-first
13

Ibid, 148.

10

century. 14 Traditionally, governments were aware of the nature of their enemies and,
since tensions were largely at the state level, it was only necessary to be wary of other
state leaders.

Contemporarily, the nature of political participation has altered

dramatically, as groups of individuals have access to many of the same forums as
governments do.

Consequently, individuals present increasingly pronounced threats

when their political opinions are manifested in the form of terrorism, especially so when
such terrorists can gain access to weapons of mass destruction. Historic and current
conflicts clearly indicate that anarchy does not provide the desired measure of security, as
threats have changed since the advent of technology and the spread of globalization. In
recent decades, the plight of the underprivileged has been gaining increased attention in
political fields, including that of security. The inclusion of many non-government actors
has helped to push human security towards the forefront of the international agenda, as a
serious threat to the development and stability of the global community. In fact, the
development of human rights must be simultaneous with the development of human
security, as they are most complete when treated as mutually inclusive. 15
Certain academics suggest that the notion that 'there cannot be security in the
absence of authority' is very telling in the contemporary era. 16 Threats to human security
include threats posed by governments, as well as non-state actors. As such, these threats
are universal in nature, which means that there is a need to prevent the perpetration of
these crimes through an authority that should be universal in nature. Indeed, international
security institutions have been an integral part of the global community in helping to
14

Ibid, 149.
Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now (New York: Commission on Human Security,
2003), 1-3.
16
Keith Krause and Michael Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies," Mearshon
International Studies Review 40 (1996): 232.
15

11

maintain at least a minimal level of cooperation amongst countries, and in calming
situations that may otherwise result in hostilities. It cannot be taken for granted that such
institutions are generally formed on the basis of promoting similar interests, usually
matters of significant importance to national interest. As such, cooperation is usually
undertaken in order to minimize loss or ensure a beneficial partnership, often because the
alternative would be more costly. 17 Though it is not possible to judge the extent of the
effectiveness of international security institutions as independent entities, namely since
they can only be as effective as their members wish them to be, these institutions have
undoubtedly contributed to shaping modern international relations. These organizations
are generally administered by the same member-states that create them, and as a result
they tend to reflect the behaviour of these states. 18 Thus, "institutions are both a product
and a cause." 19 One of the most notable characteristics of these security institutions is the
sphere of relative predictability, which is coveted presumably due to the influence they
intended to have on the behaviour of member. This can be attributed to the gradual
creation of conventional customs and practices that have been shaped by the behaviour of
member-states, and which in turn will provide a blue print for acceptable future
behaviour. 2°

Consequently, international security institutions still operate under the

guidance of member-states, obviously influenced by biases favouring the interests of the
more powerful nations. The success of such institutions should not be demeaned, but its
flaws cannot be ignored either. As long as the member states are the sole decision
makers in security issues, emphasis will be placed on economic and military interests.
17

David A. Lake, "Beyond Anarchy: The Important of Security Institutions," International Security 26, no.
1 (2001): 131 and 157.
18
Ibid, 130.
19
Ibid, 136.
20
Ibid.
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However, greater influence exerted by non-governmental actors can create a balance
between the needs of society and those of governments. The necessity for accountability
beyond the national level has been emerging since the Second World War, but there is an
increased emphasis on institutions to be removed from the reach of governmental
manipulations. This desire to be free of the powerful mechanisms of governments was a
result of the development of human rights a...-1d the necessity to establish security for
individuals.
One of the most formal acknowledgements of human security, at the outset, came
through a 1994 annual report from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP),
providing a broad definition of the concept.

Even in its ambiguity, this Human

Development Report addresses the main features of human security as being:
First, safety from such chronic threats as hunger,
disease and repression. And second, it means
protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the
patterns of daily life - whether in homes, in jobs or in
communities. 21
More specifically, the report provides seven categories of elements that constitute human
security, spanning from environmental threats to ensuring the basic necessities of life,
which include personal, community, and political security. Each of these elements is
related to the political climate of states and the strength of governments to safeguard their
citizens against heinous crimes. 22 Essentially, the core of the concept of human security
is the lack of threat to the fundamental values of humankind, which include the most
fundamental element of humanity, namely the "physical safety of the individual." 23

21

Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air," International Security 26, no. 2 (2000): 89.
Ibid, 90.
23
Fen Osler Hampson, "The Many Meanings of Human Security," in Madness in the Multitude: Human
Security and World Disorder, ed. Fen Osler Hampson ( Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001), 4.
22

13

Scholars generally approach the debate of human security from three different
perspectives, each of which outlines the extent to which the global community is
responsible for the well being of the world's citizenry. The first concept suggests that
there are certain "natural rights/rule of law" elements that should ensure an individual's
fundamental right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." According to this theory,
the burden of protecting these rights must rest on the international community. 24 The
second view furthers the definition of human security, suggesting that international
endeavours should increase efforts by strengthening and deepening the tenets of
international law, especially as it pertains to war crimes and genocide. This school of
thought focuses on the repercussions of war on the citizenry of a country, emphasizing
the importance of minimizing the effects of warfare on the most vulnerable sectors of
society. The caveat within this approach is that external involvement must be kept at an
absolute minimum. It is from this humanitarian perspective that most interventions are
born with the intent to protect the basic human rights of individuals who have had to flee
their homes as a consequence of heavy fighting. The third view is an even broader
conceptualization of the elements that must fall under the umbrella of human security.
Such elements include environmental threats as well as social and economic stability,
essentially encompassing all matters that may prove detrimental to the "livelihood and
well-being of the individuals." 25
According to this third view . . . the state of the global
economy, the forces of 'globalization', and the health of
the environment, including the world's atmosphere and
oceans, all are legitimate subjects of concern in terms of
how they impact the 'security' of the individual. 26
24

Ibid, 5.
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
25
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The common denominator amongst these categories of human security is the need
to protect individuals from governments and state actors that take advantage of their
positions vested with power. The purpose of shifting the security focus onto human
beings is to forcefully proclaim to the international community that the people of a nation
cannot be sacrificed in favour of national interests, because without its citizens a country
cannot exist. The fundamental driving force behind scholars in this field is the ultimate
centrality of human security to the establishment of any level of security on a global
scale. Academics thus suggest that international events must be judged on the basis of
possible repercussions to the well being of individuals, as opposed to viewing
international changes solely on the basis of how states are affected. 27 If a state is unable
to maintain the welfare of its citizens, it essentially becomes a 'weak' state, and is thus
more vulnerable to both internal and external threats. The weakness of the state relates to
the weakness of the individual, meaning that there is the assumption that a direct
relationship exists between the security of the state and the security of the individual. It
was well over two centuries ago that German philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote about
the benefits of securing common interests through a global mechanism of cooperation.
He suggested that it would be advantageous to all members of the international
community to act together in the prevention excessive aggression, with the added benefit
that smaller states would also gain from this protection. 28 As a result, Kantian logic
follows that the state should only be conceived of as a means to an end of security, while

27
28

Ibid, 6.
Goldstein, 111.
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recognizing that this 'end' is composed of individuals since they are the fundamental
element of society. 29
The realist perspective served the international community well when it came to
theorizing about war in the global context.

However, international relations are

changing concurrently with the evolution of societies throughout the world.

The

inclusion of certain rights that were previoJJ sly unattainable have become expected as
natural rights, such as the recognition of women's rights, minority rights, and the
development of universal norms.

Topics deemed worthy of attention suddenly

transgressed through borders and became issues that garnered global awareness. Part of
the reason for this increase in attention is the fact that the twentieth century was marred
by significant death and bloodshed of citizens at the hands of their governments for
various ethnic, political and religious reasons. 30
Several factors are responsible for bringing the issue of human security to the
foreground of the international community's attention. In the first instance, international
organizations that fortify the significance of human rights have been created in the hope
of reinforcing legal and customary standards to which all countries are supposed to be
held accountable.

A second contributing factor has been the spread of democracy

throughout the world. This becomes especially evident since the end of the Cold War, an
event that was instrumental in promoting the welfare of human beings through the
democratization process. Thirdly, much of the pressure to adhere to human rights has
come from the increase in non-government organizations (NGOs) that focus on
improving human security by pushing such issues to the forefront of global attention.
29
30

Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," Review oflnternational Studies 17, no. 4 (1991): 319.
Ibid, 323.
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Moreover, a fourth factor can be attributed to the increased availability of the media and
the internet, whereby the direct and real-time effects of armed conflict are brought into
people's homes on a daily basis. 31 A fifth element can be found in the higher numbers of
emerging middle powers that are concerned with the protection of human security and,
thus, the most vulnerable sector of society. A sixth influential factor has been the spread
and effects of globalization on the world, as interdependence increased simultaneously
with the movement of people, goods, ideas, and information across porous borders. A
final contributor to the advancement of human security can be accredited to a global
awakening in the post-Cold War era that international relations is changing, as is the
nature and constitution of conflicts. The world was no longer involved in "proxy wars"
fought on either one of the two ideological lines, predetermined by alliances with one of
the two superpowers. Rather, wars were being fought in various regions due to state
failure, perhaps fuelled by a need to establish a distinct and legitimate identity. 32
It is important to note that human security and human rights are inextricably
linked, so that one cannot be justly addressed, while the other is ignored. Through the
implementation of human rights measures, individuals are relieved from certain
debilitating pressures that influence their daily lives. When such threats are removed, a
society gains a certain level of stability, and its inhabitants can focus on improving their
quality of life. Higher population participation in every sector of a society will generally
create a more stable and accountable government, thus improving the country's situation
all around. It no longer becomes an issue of human rights alone, but must necessarily
include human security, since the purpose of this social progress is to protect the people
31
32

Hampson, 8.
Ibid, 9-10.

17

at its core. As such, while human rights are designed to address a limited amount of
issues regarding to the safety of humankind; human security broadens the number of
elements that need to be addressed. In fact, human security looks at the factors that can
cause hostility, tensions, spur aggression, and generally cause marked dissatisfaction; and
the purpose is to remove these barriers to stability and create an environment where the
citizen that wants to can flourish.
Human interaction plays an important role in shaping the expectations of a
society, and this is equally true at the international level. Technological advancements
have aided the spread of capitalism by easing the integration of goods and services from
all parts of the world, often linking nations that would otherwise not be exposed to each
other. 33

The constant influence of cultural commodities infiltrating other societies

induces a rapprochement of people, thereby allowing the formation of groups through
commonly identifiable grounds. Much of these groupings have provided a voice to those
individuals who have been affected by the negative consequences of human insecurity.
This has empowered them to advance their concerns in the global arena, and have thus
been able to stress the importance of regulating violations of human rights and restoring
dignity to the many who have been viciously stripped of it.
As a result, it can be readily assumed that, in this evolving era of globalization,
security studies is taking on an entirely new challenge by addressing the changing threats
to global stability. As argued by analyst Barry Buzan, there has been a change in both
the referent object and referent subject, which used to be the state and the military
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respectively. 34 It is no longer possible to have human insecurity and hope to maintain
safety within and around borders. With focus shifting to the security of the individual,
the referent object then becomes the individual and, in terms of addressing one aspect of
human security, international institutions aimed at deterring crimes against humanity
becomes one of the referent subjects.
Analyst Caroline Fehl explains that a significant obstacle to the proper
functioning of international institutions is the 'sovereignty costs':
Sovereignty costs of centralized decision-making
across issue areas and among actors - they are highest
if an issue touches [upon] the hallmarks of
(Westphalian) sovereignty, such as a state's relation to
its citizens and territory. 35
These costs are considered to rise with the power of the state, thus decreasing with
weaker states. 36 The root of this conflict can be found in the emergence of a new
direction in international relations that is conflicting with traditional norms.
The result has been a paradigm shift in the
management of national and international politics.
The defining elements of this paradigm shift have
been globalization and the liberalization of access to
knowledge, both of which have helped the srread of
information and education about human rights 7
Since the international community has become aware of the consequences of ignoring
repeated calls for the prevention of heinous crimes, the issue of human rights has taken
on global significance. This promotion has been received with some hostility by the
nations that resent the shift of human rights from a regional level, to an international
34

Barry Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers Inc.,
1998): 36-42.
35
Caroline Fehl, "Explaining the International Criminal Court: A Practice Test for Rationalist and
Constructivist Approaches," European Journal of International Relations 10, no. 3 (2004): 364.
36
Ibid.
37
Monshipoori and Wei� 372.

19

one. 38 However, giving authority to an institution that is to ensure the protection of a
global phenomenon would require a degree of power to be vested into that organization.
There does not exist an infinite amount of power around the international arena and, as
such, power must be shifted from states to this overarching institution.
Consequently, issues of sovereignty are raised by states that are trying to cling to
their individual power and might, in accordance with the traditional tenets embodied in
global relations. Since sovereignty is headed towards decentralization and dissemination,
the fight becomes, as Richard Falk suggests, "emblematic of the fight for the soul of the
state. "39 This is in reference to the shift from using the state as a too] for the protection
and promotion of international trade ventures towards creating equilibrium between the
success of markets and safeguarding of the people.

The fact remains that, as

globalization takes hold of the world, scholars and political players face the challenge of
redefining power and authority, as well as re-evaluating the role of actors within different
levels of international relations.

An inevitable consequence of this would be an

expansion of the elements involved in the nature of power and authority, namely because
there is an obvious need to include certain complexities that have been previous! y
excluded. 40 However, although the role and participation of political leadership may be
changing in nature, this does not mean that the power of the state is either declining or
weakening.

Moreover, as cautioned by academic Christopher May, none of these

changes mean that states are becoming obsolete, especially since states themselves have

38

Ibid.
Ibid, 373.
40
Ibid, 374.
39

20

been instrumental in facilitating the advancement of globalization.

41

Part of the power

that has been 'taken away' from state sovereignty has been redirected towards
accountability at the international level, namely in the protection of human rights and
human security.
When distance prevents much of the possible interaction between cultures and
across borders there is a lessened degree of reliance between countries. As such, there
develops a greater respect for sovereignty, as well as less concern for the possibility of
'spill over' of domestic problems into the international arena. Nevertheless, old practices
no longer apply in the present era, as the global community has acquired increased
awareness that there is a level of dependence between states.

Advancements in

technology and communications certainly allow people to stay m closer contact,
regardless of geographical separation, and thus the 'global village' 1s becoming a
rea1.1ty. 42
The world is increasingly tied into a global market of
production, trade and finance, whose circulation
system is an ever more efficient transportation
network ... and whose nervous system is a world-wide
web of electronic communication and data processing
facilities. 43
One fact that is indisputable is that the fundamental driving force of every society is its
work force, namely its citizenry. If they feel threatened or unstable, it only stands to
reason that the overall operations of the state will also falter. As such, "the dialectic of
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threats and vulnerabilities is strongly shaped by the technologies of interaction." 44 It is
shrinking the world as national borders become increasingly permeable and no longer
presents the same degree of separation and protection that was traditionally considered
fundamental to the well-being of the state.
Though the political arena is the birthplace of many conflicts and wars, it is also a
breeding ground through which many safeguards for the less fortunate were put into
place. It represents, at the very least, a recognition that the value of humanity should
transgress beyond territorial concerns. Isolationist policies are no longer considered the
norm, and are often repudiated in favour of cooperation for the promotion of a society's
well-being. The twentieth century gave way to the beginnings of human security, which
was permitted to gain popularity and strength through the constant facilitation of
communication and transportation technologies. Due to the forced acknowledgement of
a higher authority, as well as the possibility that there will inevitably be some loss of both
state sovereignty and autonomy, it is unquestionable that not all nations have readily
embraced the shift in security studies. However, the fact remains that the structures of
negotiations and interactions on a global scale are changing and allowing more players to
be involved in shaping today's international society.

This has, in turn, enabled the

development of increasingly universal, as opposed to regional, tenets. It has taken more
than a few decades to establish conventions capable of garnering significant international
support, and the beginning of the twenty-first century continues to be fraught with
hostilities surrounding such tenets. Though there is still much that needs to be done to
ensure human security, it is vital to recognize the progresses made within the
international community particularly since the Second World War.
44
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Chapter Two: Universality of Human Rights
The precursor to, and fundamental element of, human security is the development
of human rights, which continues to evolve as more needs emerge from various areas of
the world. The aftermath of the Second World War was a devastating mixture of massive
bloodshed and widespread destruction. It was a bittersweet triumph for the victorious, as
both willing and unwilling participants of the war suffered crippling damages to their
populations and infrastructures. Born of vicious atrocities against people of all faiths and
cultures, the beginning of a new moral consciousness spread throughout the global arena.
This new phenomenon spurred numerous changes that would alter the future of
international relations for years to come. The far reaching consequences of the blatant
disregard for the sanctity of human life, oblivious to territorial boundaries, weakened the
economies of entire nations. The global community was not only outraged at the cost and
amount of time that would be required in the rebuilding of war-torn societies, but also
sought to bring justice to the victims of war by making the perpetrators accountable for
their actions.

A voiding conflict is beneficial to most countries, as leaders strive to

prevent its occurrence in favour of maintaining an enduring, albeit precarious, peace. As
such, the international community chose to cooperate with each other in order to
empower their efforts, namely by implementing certain safeguards to avoid the
perpetration of large-scale atrocities beyond the 'collateral damage' of armed conflict.
The evolution of human rights from a practical framework of universal jurisdiction and
protection eventually lead to the creation of treaties and agreements, which can be
considered as the precursors to the notion of universality and the creation of the
International Criminal Court.

23

Since the middle of the twentieth century, humankind has progressed significantly
in its aim to promote the issues of human rights in the international arena. Accordingly,
the creation of the United Nations (UN) and the UN Charter were impressive
accomplishments for that period in history, especially given the dynamics of world affairs
at the time. Though neither the structure of the organization, nor the treaty on which it is
based, are flawless, they nonetheless paved the way for continuous improvement. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), that closely followed the inception of
the United Nations, remains a hugely symbolic document in and of itself. Its importance
lies in the fact that the signatories, by virtue of signing and agreeing to the document,
acknowledged the necessity of providing the global community with blanket values that
are believed to transcend cultural, religious, and traditional norms. Moreover, in 1948,
the UN' s General Assembly (GA) adopted the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which introduced an added element to these
international agreements. This Convention recognizes that states cannot systematically
abuse individuals without being held accountable to international laws. As such, it
requires all signatories to assist in the prevention and punishment of crimes of genocide,
which is understood to be acts perpetrated with the intention of eliminating, to any extent,
national, religious, ethnic, or racial groups. 45 The international community, for the first
time, thus emphasized the fact that it will no longer accept or tolerate gross violations of
human dignity, even under the purview of war. Essentially,
the Genocide Convention of 1948 and the 1949
Geneva Conventions and their Protocols of 1977. . . in
tum developed the scope of genocide as a crime
against humanity and extended international
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responsibility into situations of internal armed
conflict. 46
As such, from the 1960s and onwards, the notion of human rights has followed a
constant, if not consistent, path of changes and developments that have gradually lead to
a previously unimaginable rapprochement of the global community. It is important to
recognize that concerns about human rights have led to a more complex and
comprehensive theory, that of human security, which addresses the new threats of the
contemporary era. Human rights and human security are therefore mutually inclusive, so
that the success of one is dependent on the success of the other. Nevertheless, the
achievement of progress has not been without its obstacles, as issues of state sovereignty,
traditionally embedded into the grain of national leadership, collide with emerging
notions of universality and accountability.
At the core of the theory of universal jurisdiction is that it must, to an extent,
surpass national sovereignty in order to be an effective mechanism, intolerant of
immunity. There are two approaches to the issue of sovereignty, very similar in some
elements, but very different in their breadth. Both positions agree that a prerequisite to
universality is concurrence of common values and goals shared by the global community.
Subsequently, common to both schools of thought is the need for the collective will and
the commitment to prosecute any infringement of these shared values.

However,

underlying these requirements is the obvious need for the belief that collective action, in
this case universal jurisdiction, will indeed act as a deterrent to the perpetration of
heinous crimes. "Under both positions, the goal is to give each and all sovereignties, as
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well as international organs, the power to individually or collectively enforce certain
international proscriptions." 47 Nonetheless, both positions can be distinguished from one
another in that the 'normative universalist' approach considers the importance of these
common values as justification for the disregard of territorial integrity, should the
situation warrant such action. However, the 'pragmatic policy-oriented' approach will
only concede that there are certain occasions where the overlapping of interests is so
strong that there is a need for enforcement mechanisms greater than those available
through national jurisdiction. 48

Currently, most nations throughout the world have

somewhat grudgingly accepted the latter of the two schools of thought in order to
advance the efforts of protecting humanity in the hopes of increasing security.
Although the evolution of traditional security into human security has benefited
from the development of human rights, none of the fundamental concepts of human
security were initially accepted and digested with ease by the international community.
Ideas of cooperation and accountability unavoidably raised concerns of national integrity
and autonomy, thereby generating hostility towards the changes taking place within the
global arena. From the outset, it was the strength with which the notion of human rights
emerged after WWII that spurred the creation of the United Nations, its Charter, and its
Declaration of Human Rights. 49 In fact, the United Nations came into being as a result of
a series of events that culminated with the end of the Second World War.

Certain

scholars suggest that the failure of the UN's predecessor, the League of Nations, is
primarily due to two factors. The first notable flaw was the lack of support from the
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United States, a nation that continues to retain enormous international power and clout.
Thus, without the inclusion of all great powers the League was unable to affirm a united
front. The second problem lay in the unwillingness of the member-states to absorb the
high costs associated with a collective opposition to violence. 50

Nevertheless, the

alliances that won the Second World War had already established a cooperative
relationship amongst each other in order to defeat the enemy. Finding this network of
support profitable, they sought to maintain their diplomatic ties beyond the
responsibilities of conflict, namely with the development of an organization that would
have increased international effectiveness and unparalleled universal solidarity. Notably,
amidst the worldwide cries of 'Never Again' that followed the humanitarian devastation
of WWII, the United States assured its allies of its support for this new and improved
organization, and even became a key framer in its creation. 51

As a result of many

international and domestic debates about establishing an organization where membership
would include friends and foes alike, the United Nations came into being on October 24,
1945. 52 Today, the UN continues to be regarded as an intended focal group, created
principally to ensure peace, security, and justice throughout the world as defined under its
Charter.
As one the UN' s founding documents, the negotiations and drafting of the UN
Charter were represented as a democratic endeavour allowing the participation and
influence of all nations in attendance.

However, the outcome of the meetings, and

therefore the final document, was heavily influenced by the five strongest global powers
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that founded the UN, namely those that continue to maintain permanent member status in
the organization: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Russian Federation,
and the People's Republic of China. 53 The UN Charter came to be seen as "a de facto
constitution" for the United Nations since it provides guidelines for the creation,
administration, and functioning of the organization, as well as the distribution of powers
and areas of jurisdiction. 54

Moreover, it clearly states the goals and aims of the

organization, as well as the principles on which it rests. 55 In the early years of its
inception, its principles would be shared throughout significant regions of the global
community; however, today almost all nations participate and adhere to these standards.
The agreement of members to ratify the UN Charter was an important step at the time
because it represented a widespread concurrence in principles, and when states consent to
collective actions they do so under the accepted norms in this Charter. One of the major
hurdles facing the international community during the ratification process, however, was
the reluctance of UN member-states to apply the Charter to domestic matters. While
many countries endorsed this international treaty, a number of others were still tolerating
significant violations of basic human rights within their borders, giving rise to concerns
over the efficacy of a vague UN Charter. 56 Accordingly, resolutions were adopted by the
United Nations that allowed the development of sub-committees with the authority to
implement mechanisms equipped to handle complaints of gross human rights violations.
Interestingly, these provisions are still active today, and have encouraged a number of
other initiatives within the international community that address widespread abuse of
53
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human rights. 57 Regardless, the United Nations continues to maintain that its principles
have not significantly changed throughout the years, and that it remains dedicated to the
promotion of peace and cooperation, adherence to human rights, and development of
society. Moreover, coupled with the development of the United Nations Charter, another
document was created that would further mark history and continue to represent the
importance of universal cooperation well into contemporary times.
Also adopted by the GA in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
represents the international community's desire to actualize, in writing, the fundamental
elements that constitute the rights of individuals. 58 The creation and advancement of
human rights following the Second World War developed in response to the realization
that states willing to abuse their own citizens can, in turn, produce the damaging
consequence of negative 'spill over' into other nations. As such, the major powers at the
helm of international relations collectively agreed that the violent treatment of individuals
would not be tolerated, and would be seen as an infringement of peace. It was one of the
first historical steps that opened domestic borders to international concerns; as the
treatment of a country's citizens within its own territory became an issue open to
discussion in the international community. 59 Some analysts even denote the Declaration
as "the enlightened conscience of mankind."

60

Interestingly, although the international

community was heavily involved in cooperation and constructive discussion during the
creation of the UDHR, many nations would not veer from the traditional viewpoint that
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the sovereignty of states was the ultimate level authority and should not be surpassed. It
was generally accepted that since a government is responsible for ensuring the rights of
its citizens, it was necessary for the people to have a means for redress should these rights
be violated. 61 However, heated debates during negotiations surrounded the merits of this
right to petition claims, either at the national and international level. Initially, Cuba
proposed the inclusion of the right to solely petition national governments for violations
of human rights; but the French proposal wanted petition rights to be permissible at the
international level, within the United Nations. It is the nature of the debates surrounding
France's controversial proposition that is of most interest. Certain representatives fully
supported the inclusion of such an article in the UDHR. They based their arguments on
the notion that, if the only concern was simply the enforcement of these rights, this
predicament should be alleviated by the fact that the "Declaration 'constituted a general
statement of principles and did not entail any legal obligation'." 62 However, most of
these delegates also contended that the inclusion of the right to petition at the
international level would hint at a jurisdiction created that outstrips the national level,
thus violating the principles of state sovereignty. The general view was that "the French
proposal was on target in principles, but was nonetheless premature� the time was not ripe
to assert such a right realistically."63
The seeds of universality had been planted long ago, but traditional cultural,
political and legal boundaries remained rather difficult to resolve. Issues arising from the
methods of implementation eventually resulted in the omission of certain human rights
issues, such as the right to petition or the right to resist oppression, both of which faced
61
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similar objections. 64 In fact, the Declaration was only meant as a preamble to other
multilateral treaties that would make the agreements binding between countries. As such,
the entire process was extremely slow and arduous, often requiring a couple of decades to
bring an idea from inception to fruition. 65 Certain participating nations, such as the
United States, also faced objections from within their borders with regards to any kind of
In the case of the US,

disagreements were generally founded on fears that such international agreements may
alter or infringe upon American civil rights, which are considered a cornerstone of their
society. At that time, there were further concerns that the global elimination of racial
discrimination would hinder the common practice of segregation in individual US
states. 66 Regardless, though some members of the United Nations initially resisted the
infiltration of the UDHR into their own national systems, it was far from being a final
attempt at finding an appropriate balance between traditional norms and emerging
concepts within the global community. Moreover, academics generally tend to agree that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the precursor to a global revolution that
would alter the general atmosphere within the international arena, thereby introducing
accountability for grave violations of the sanctity of human life.
Following these developments in the United Nations, the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, and their two Additional Protocols of 1977, are considered the
principal instruments of humanitarian law." 67 The work of the Diplomatic Conference on
64
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binding multilateral treaties that enforce human rights.

the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflicts, held in Geneva from 1974 to 1977, resulted in the adoption of two
Protocols that were added to the Geneva Conventions. Protocol I, applicable in
international armed conflicts, protects civilians against the effects of hostilities and
extends prisoner-of-war status to guerrilla fighters; while Protocol II gives increased
protection to the victims of high-intensity non--international armed conflicts. 68 Article 3
of the Convention, however, is also of extreme importance. It not only outlines the basic
rules for the treatment of civilians during conflict, but also details what constitutes a
"civilian" during the times of conflict. The description of "persons taking no active part
in the hostilities" not only refers to state inhabitants, but also to members of the armed
forces who are not actively fighting, such as off-duty, sick, and wounded soldiers. 69 This
Article firmly states that this group of people must not come to any physical harm during
wartime. They are to be excluded from the conflict and cannot to be tortured, mutilated,
taken hostage, or murdered. Moreover, they must also be protected from any kind of
abuse to their personal dignity, and they may not be judged or be executed without the
judgement of a regularly constituted court. 70
It is undeniable that, in today's ever shrinking world, the interconnectedness and
interdependence of states have affected the development of international law. History
shows that, international laws were previously developed through bilateral treaties
between autonomous states. However, this has been transformed as bilateral treaties
were being increasingly replaced with more multilateral agreements. These treaties have
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not only given shape to international organizations but have also played a large role in
coordinating, facilitating, and influencing international relations theory in the
development of international legal principles.
During much of the 1940s and early 1950s, international actors chose to ignore
the astounding level of allegations of human rights violations brought to the United
Nations. The catalyst came late in the 1950s, however, with a UN resolution explaining
that the organization would not involve itself with such allegations and does not have the
power to investigate claims. This created a substantial amount of controversy which
witnessed the birth of movements to bring about change in the 1960s. 71 One of the
changes made was that the UN agreed to investigate claims, although only to a relatively
limited extent, and recommendations could be made to the accused country. 72 Despite
restrictions, however, this was nevertheless a step in the right direction.
Efforts to continue human rights development also resurfaced during this decade,
namely with the establishment of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). The 1960s were marked by a number of advances, such as the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, as well as the Covenants and the
protocol to ICCPR. The era also gave birth to important developments for legislative
initiatives that, surprisingly, had a great deal of international support. It was also in the
early 1960s that the group Amnesty International was formed, and began to develop into
a significantly powerful and effective non-government organization. Another defining
aspect of that era is thus reflected in the sudden increase in intellectual and academic
contributions to human rights, most notably credited to the collective work of a number
Rogers. Clark, "Human Rights Strategies of the 1960s Within the United Nations: A Tribute to the Late
Kamleshwar Das," Human Rights Quarterly 21, no. 2 (1999): 320.
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of NGOs. 73

Much of the era, however, also experienced significant disagreements

regarding the manner in which the principles of human rights, founded on the UN
Charter, can be actualized into a set of applicable rules. Since the early 1960s saw an
increased number of newly independent countries joining the United Nations, it is only
logical that the decade was witness to declarations and committees dealing with
colonialism and racism. Many of the era's endeavours, therefore, appeared to be a
'follow-up' of efforts undertaken in the 1940s during the development of the UDHR, as
well as the struggle to rid certain African countries of their crippling and controversial
apartheid. A significant obstacle to these efforts, however, always surfaced when it came
to issues of enforcement and, towards the latter part of the decade, the attention and
endeavours of the global community thus shifted to "modes of supervision and
enforcement." 74 Consequently, much of the discussion in the 1960s centered on the
achievement of two fundamental goals: "(i) to complete the drafting of fundamental
instruments, and (ii) to devise methods of implementation." 75 These, in turn, helped
shape many of the future strategies of the United Nations.
It was in the late 1960s and early 1970s that another important development took
place, structured as a draft resolution, which would later become the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights. The purpose for the creation of such an institution was
to provide an organized framework with the legitimacy to delve into areas that had
previously been 'off limits'. 76 The end of the 1960s and two the subsequent decades,
thus mark a second highly significant phase of human rights progress, which is evidenced
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by the building of institutions to address the rising threats to humanity. 77 As the 1970s
continued to witness an improvement and evolution of the tenets of human rights, the
decade highlighted important steps in the process that led to contemporary notions of
protecting human rights from actors that violate the accepted universal standards. It was
an era that witnessed "the emergence and consolidation of universal and regional treaty
based institutions for the protection of human rights. " 78

American and European

Conventions were creating courts to deal with human rights violations, while different
organs of the United Nations were creating policies and agencies to address the rising
concerns of the world's populations. It is the creation of such institutions that led to an
increase in the number of NGOs, almost all of which became more active during this
period, though some were created much earlier. 79
The creation of. . . intergovernmental human rights .
institutions. . . provided the nongovernmental organizations
with their raison d'etre for filing human rights complaints
and mounting human rights enforcement campaigns on the
national and international plane. In earlier times their
principal role consisted of the promotion of normative
instruments. 80
There are a few factors that can be attributed to these earlier shifts taking place in
the international community, prompting movements that would forever alter the outlook
of global relations. The decolonization process opened the door to many newcomers into
the United Nations, many of them originating in the African continent, which in turn
prompted a growth in the organization, predominantly in the 1950s and 1960s. The
newer members maintained a common agenda that was primarily aimed at the eradication
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of apartheid; a task that could only be accomplished through the development and
solidification of UN instruments that dealt with violations of human rights. The support
that the Soviet Union and its collaborators showed for the issue of eradication of
apartheid opened the door for Western democracies to further expand the jurisdiction of
UN institutions to encompass additional types of atrocious human rights violations. 81
The increased attention given to the subject of human rights by actors in both
hemispheres, as well as non-governmental actors, required the global community to focus
on the outcome of these measures. In fact, there was a growing anticipation that the
United Nations, and other global organizations subsequently created, would be able to
address serious violations of human rights standards.

As such, many governments

throughout the world felt the need to voice their support for such organizations, finding it
increasingly difficult to resist regional counterparts that were being created. 82
The Cold War, however, had a negative impact on the advancement of human
rights due to the fact that the primary concern of the political actors involved was the
build-up of military might, nuclear arsenal, ideological differences, as well as economic
considerations. The fact is that both major players, the United States and the Soviet
Union, were willing to support regimes known to be in violation of international
protocols, as long as the end result was the political attainment of greater alliances.
Nonetheless, an important event in the 1970s marked significant progress for the
evolution of human rights. While the United States and the Soviet Union reached "a
period of detente", the creation of the Helsinki Agreements brought to the forefront issues
of human rights for the first time during the Cold War. Though these agreements were
81
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violated on a number of occasions and by a number of nations, they nonetheless produced
a common agreement as to the treatment of individuals. The purpose was to provide
guidelines for acceptable behaviour, and a set of standards against which to judge each
other's actions. 83 Moreover, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the common name for the
agreement that created the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),
is hailed as one of the most significant steps towards establishing issues of human rights
in Western countries. The Soviet Union instigated talks for the agreement in the 1950s,
primarily as a means of establishing its authority within Eastern Europe; and though it
was not initially created specifically for the purpose of addressing human rights, it was
nevertheless an important factor in shaping the future of East-West relations. It took
approximately twenty-five years to reach the required compromises and obtain the
necessary amount of signatures, but eventually thirty-five nations signed on to the
agreement. Many states felt that they had volunteered important compromises, in essence
based on the exchange of "military and economic cooperation" for Soviet acceptance of
certain human rights stipulations. 84 The leaders of the Soviet Union initially resisted the
insertion of human rights into the Helsinki Final Act, yet were forced to admit that these
rights were "a legitimate part of diplomatic relations among the thirty-five states
participating in the CSCE." 85 The result of this agreement left the Eastern countries
vulnerable to a great deal of criticism, namely due to their continuous violations of
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However, it was the end of the Cold War that required a complete revaluation of
security threats. During the Cold War, the goal of both the United States and the Soviet
Union was to control, and possibly expand, their own spheres of influence, it in order to
ensure the destruction of their rival's ideologies.

In the post-Cold War era, many

developing nations, that had previously been 'kept in check' by the bi-polar power
structure, lost their 'footing' when this structure crumbled. This upset in balance enabled
corrupt and ruthless groups to try to seize power, often using civilians as targets to
emphasize their control over territory. The collapse of the Soviet Union, and thus a
decrease in tensions between Eastern and Western superpowers, created an atmosphere
more conducive to the consideration of cooperation. It was as a result of these changes
that states recognized the need to implement appropriate measures that would be able to
address direct violations of human rights laws, especially as security threats were being
redefined. Concern over the trafficking of drugs and acts of terrorism threatened all
countries and economies, and thereby created a common ground on which cooperation
proved beneficial. 87 With the strong ideological obstacles of the Cold War no longer
influencing the East-West divide, the global community was thus ready to establish the
Vienna Declaration on Human Rights in 1993.
The Declaration highlights a significant portion of the more contemporary issues
involving human rights. Though it cannot be argued that the document provides the
solution to the eradication of violations of human rights, it is effective in emphasizing the
message to the international community that these concerns should be held in high regard
and violations will not be condoned. Since the document encompasses all aspects of
society, be it civil or political, and protects all members of the community without
87
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discrimination, it can be argued that its aim is truly the "protection of all human rights"
as a justifiable global apprehension. 88 As such, "it would appear that the dividing line
between domestic and international human rights issues is no more because its factual
and legal basis has disappeared. "89 The monumental step represented by the Vienna
Declaration is indicative of an important factor that had been at the core of international
relations for many years, much like traditional notions of security and sovereignty. It
used to be that cultural and traditional tendencies provided an excuse for various
violations of human rights throughout the world, unstoppable by other countries as any
intervention would be considered an infringement on state autonomy. However, changes
in global mentality have created the perfect breeding grounds for the creation of
accountability beyond national levels. Another important notion that emerged from the
end of the Cold War was the fact that it was no longer an acceptable tenet of politics that
all types of government structures are capable of ensuring the protection of human rights.
For many years, the global community turned a blind eye to serious and gross violations
on the basis of states having different political structures. However, the end of the Cold
War clearly proved that democracy and human rights are mutually inclusive, thus both
must be present for the establishment of a free society. 90
The absence of democracy in a state is today in itself a
violation of human rights of its population and . . . the
international community has the right for that very
reason to concern itself with efforts designed to
remove obstacles to its democratization. 91
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The new millennium has brought with it even greater challenges to the
implementation of human rights and, by extension, efforts to promote human security.
Whereas global actors promoting human rights were once concerned primarily with the
actions of various governments towards their citizens; today it is understood that, even
with the good-will of leaders, it remains impossible to prevent all breaches in established
universal standards. The key is to establish the idea that actors who previously enjoyed
impunity from persecution due to sovereignty issues are no longer safe, because the
international community is taking a stance against the abuse of human rights.

92

The creation of universal norms has had its critics, claiming that different cultures
approach the concept differently, thus eliminating its characteristic universality.
Nonetheless, the concept of rights can be found in ancient and modern cultures across the
globe, and "the fact that there is often not a specific word for rights does not militate
against the further fact that the concept of rights can nonetheless be attributed to the ideas
and practices of different cultures. " 93 In understanding that the UN' s abilities as a world
leader in human rights are limited, mainly by state sovereignty, this in itself provides a
more universal role in crosscutting cultures to accommodate all perspectives. 94 The
broad range with which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights treats and identifies
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, helps to secure the differing values
and thus generate more acceptance for its adoption. Furthermore, the UN Charter has
done a great deal for a peaceful advancement of the issues of human rights, including
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simply providing information and educational seminars for the signatories. 95
Universalism has proven to be an effective tool in the preservation of peace on a global
scale. The reason for universality's success would lie in the fact that it encourages the
pooling of resources to eliminate common problems reached through a universal
consensus of concerns, recognizing that certain issues are similar within vanous
countries. It essentially exercises broader powers over a variety of subjects. 96
Certain scholars suggest that human rights should be more universal in the
language and terms employed in the UN Charter. These terms should be free from
reference to any particular values but applicable to all, as opposed to basing the Charter
on notions of modern industrial societies and of liberal democracies. 97 In this respect,
these analysts argue that the conception of human rights in the UN is no longer universal,
as it loses significance for much of the Third World, implying that these nations ought to
become liberal, democratic, industrial societies. 98 Moreover, critics suggest that the UN
conception of human right has been made to carry more weight then it can bear, and thus
issues of human rights have lost the ability to remain universal for all nations.
Consequently, the major reasoning behind this is the notion that there has been a failure
to understand that human rights must be based on, "general principles which must be
implemented in ways appropriate to the particular values and institutions of different
· ·

communities. ,,99
This problem was avoided in the creation of the ICC since all countries were
active participants in its development and, as such, it was devised to accommodate
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different types of governments and legislations representing all countries and their values.
Many of the discrepancies in values and customs have been taken into consideration and
reflected in the Rome Statute, as negotiations alleviated many concerns. Consequently,
the prosecution of criminals previously held unaccountable is a step towards ensuring the
sanctity of human security, and that mechanisms are in place to ensure justice for the
victims and violators. Although it can act as a deterrent for certain violent criminals,
more importantly, the International Criminal Court sends the message to the global
community that the significance of human security is tantamount in politics and abuses
will not be tolerated. One can almost see, in theory, that the Rome Statute creating the
ICC is a codification of some of the abstract notions in human security and humanitarian
law.
Since common threats were identified, it became a common problem for which a
common solution would be ideal. 100 Thus began the shift from a state-centric approach to
a focus on individuals, suggesting that sustainable human development was preferable to
the maintenance of significant destructive capabilities. 101 Security and human rights are
important concepts in and of themselves, but they are also interconnected in that the
success of one depends on the success of the other, especially in an era of globalization,
significant technological development, and economic interdependence. Although human
rights violations may not be the only cause of civil conflict, they do however, act as a
catalyst as it helps to aggravate instability. Consequently, meeting security needs entails
respecting human rights because "countries [that] are well governed and respect the
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human rights of their citizens are better placed to avoid the horrors of conflict and to
overcome obstacles to development." 102
Human security essentially 'stole the spotlight' when the United Nations
Development Programme suggested that the end of the Cold War should be marked with
a shift in the study of security, proposing a move from nuclear security to human
security. 103 Consequently, the UNDP suggests that notions of human security should
outweigh other concerns.
It is a universal concern, relevant to people everywhere
because the threats are common to all; its components are
interdependent since the threats to human security do not
stay within national borders; it is easier to achieve through
early rather than later intervention; and it is people
centered, in that it is concerned with how people "live and
breath" in society. 104
Discussions about needs and interests must entail discussion about rights, which has been
a fast growing discipline. Politically, the language of rights is one of the only aspects that
transcend most borders, barriers, and differences to create a common goal that is
universally accepted.

Consequently, the rights that are embraced and embedded in

political systems are intended to reflect the basic morals common to that society. 105 It is
important to note that these values are not absolute and may change as generations and
cultures evolve; there are no mechanisms that allow determination of what 'rights' and
what 'wrongs' are acceptable except the will of the society which declares it. Scholars,
such as Francis Fukuyama, thus argue that human values cannot be differentiated from
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human emotions, each being as complex as the other, and both acting as influential agents
in shaping societal norms. 106
Philosophers such as Kant and Nietzsche, respectively, suggested that human
beings are capable of having free will, and that they can also create values just by
associating with certain value laden words, such as 'good' or 'bad'. However, Kant
suggested that this free will is to be used following practical reasoning, which is not
necessarily synonymous with individual wants. 107

Contemporary society has been

gradually progressing towards a universalization of certain standards, such as
applications to market behaviours and human rights, even if it may be contradictory to
the self-interest of political actors. This is in large part due to the realization that the
long-term stability of the masses is much more productive than short-term gains that may
be followed by destabilizing forces brought about by the dissatisfaction of the people.
Unfortunately, the trend in contemporary society has been the pursuit of individual
desires and wants, as opposed to needs, often at the expense of the large sectors of
society. As a result, decisions that used to reflect moral choices have come to reflect
purely interest driven ones.
Theorists suggest that humans are "social animals" who seek out and thrive in
common understandings of norms and values, but are, at the same time, competitive and
cooperative. To the extent that it is beneficial to cooperate, human beings will engage in
accommodating behaviour, but beyond the satisfaction of those needs, people revert to
competitiveness. It is thus not illogical to suggest that actors on the global scene find that
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cooperating to restrict certain major destabilizing forces in the world will create an
international arena more conducive to positive competition. 108

The concept of universal jurisdiction has gained significant attention from the
global community as a means to deter certain international criminal acts; and its support
is manifested in the number of treaties and organizations that have been created with the
aim to establish universal standards. However, if the power of universal jurisdiction was
manipulated into a mechanism to achieve political ends, at the detriment of other
legitimate members of the international community, "universal jurisdiction could disrupt
world order and deprive individuals of their basic rights." 109 There has been a great deal
of debate and initial resistance to implementing notions of universal jurisdiction. That
the United Nations endured, unlike its predecessor, was a formidable feat as it provided a
forum for global dialogue. In light of the progress of cooperation, it seems out-dated to
consider the United Nations as an example of a successful international institution for
modern needs, though at the time of its inception it represented an important international
cooperative effort. Contemporarily, on the other hand, the fact that it derives its power
from the strong states that created it categorizes the UN as a biased institution, thereby
weakening its credibility in an era rife with demands for human rights and accountability.
Various efforts for the continuous protection of human rights and human security have,
therefore, gradually developed into legal norms. Though the process of adding law to
universal standards began decades ago, it is only in beginning of the twenty-first century
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that the leading steps towards legally supported criminal accountability was brought to a
global level.

46

Chapter Three: The Creation of the ICC
The creation of universal values regarding human rights and the advancements
made in the field of human security are indeed worthy of praise. It has taken numerous
members of the international community a great deal of difficulty to overcome traditional
tendencies.

However, the global community does not yet uniformly observe the

acknowledgement of universal values, and has not fully accepted the notion that the
preservation of sovereignty should take a 'back seat' to that of the citizenry. Recognizing
that the defection of certain members can have significant security repercussion for other
members, actors within the international community thus turned to the potential of legal
mechanism as a means of deterring violent behaviour.
While human rights principals predominantly centre on governance during times
of peace, especially in terms of law enforcement, humanitarian law focuses on situations
that concern international or non-international armed conflict. However the two concepts
are not mutually exclusive. Human rights violations can still take place in times of armed
conflict, and it is international humanitarian law that is applicable in such cases. 110 This
was necessary in order to reconcile the two frameworks given the lack of guidance that
human rights treaties provide with respect to the conduct of hostilities. Yet, humanitarian
law treaties do not explicitly deal with internal armed conflicts, and hence, it has been a
practice to 'borrow' from the humanitarian law of international armed conflicts to fill this
void. 111 As one scholar suggests, there are three ways in which this 'borrowing' has
taken form:
One method has been to interpret the broad rules provided in
Common Article 3 and Protocol II in light of the detailed rules
11
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provided in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I.
Another method has been to argue that internal conflicts are
governed by customary international law rules paralleling the
treaty law rules governing international conflicts. A third
method has been to extend the reach of treaties governing
international conflicts to apply to internal conflicts. 112
Drawing a parallel with international political relations, academic scholars argue
that the world is currently involved in a shift from the traditional Grotian framework of
international legal relations to a new approach that attempts to create a 'community
responsibility', Kantian framework.

While the former is advocating an international

society of independent actors, the latter advocates a universal society of human beings
without focusing on the need to preserve state autonomy at all cost. The Grotian school
is focused on maintaining and strengthening sovereignty through the promotion of
national interests. Understandably, in this framework, priority is not given to the needs
of the people within state boundaries but rather to preserving the territorial integrity of
that nation.113 The Kantian school of thought, on the other hand, places greater value on
people, not territorial integrity, and is premised on the notion that collectivity is much
more conducive to prosperity. Nevertheless, throughout much of recent history, it was
the Grotian perspective that formed the foreign policy decisions of many countries.
Memories of colonization are still fresh for much of the world, and create an automatic
reservation towards most international dictum that imply even minimal interference with
domestic matters, especially when influenced by the bias of other nations. Continuous
efforts since the middle of the twentieth century, however, have allowed the progression
of universal values to an impressive extent. An excellent case study of the theoretical
112
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shift occurring both in international relations as well as international legal relations is the
inception of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Although the Rome Statute, the
founding treaty of the ICC, is not flawless and has a certain degree of ambiguity
embedded within it, the Court is nevertheless the first completely independent and
binding international organization that takes universal standards to new heights. It was
necessary to implement certain compromises into the Rome Statute in order to gain the
support of many nations. Since the Treaty had to be sensitive to concerns about creating
an imposing and intrusive international organization, it was forced to gain the trust of the
participants by ensuring that their rights as sovereign countries would not be affected.
At the root of the Grotian theory, which is predominantly concerned with global
conflicts, is the belief that humans are driven by two distinct and basic compulsions.
While humans cannot avoid clashes between each other as a result of differing "ideas of
the good,"114 they are also "socially-minded" individuals who desire to live alongside one
another. 115 Moreover, legal theorists contend that the seventeenth century Dutch scholar
Hugo Grotius suggested that at the core of the human being is an inherent instinct for
self-preservation. 116 It is on the Grotian basis of solidarity, from which this school of
thought suggests that self-preservation derives, that societies implement mechanisms like
"solidarity in the enforcement of the law"; and expect the understanding that war is often
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a law enforcement mechanism where legitimacy is dependent on the service it provides to
the international community. 117
Grotian scholars view the law as "a language and mechanism for the systemic
application of reason to problems of social order and conflict."118

In the Grotian

perspective, it is accepted as fact that the more powerful states will assert themselves
internationally while weaker countries must simply tolerate these impositions. Moreover,
due to the variety of cultures and beliefs, it would be unreasonable to expect the
establishment of a truly stable system of universal values that represents every
concern. 119 Academics in the Grotian school see· reason behind state hierarchy and, in
light of this 'positioning system', they find it pragmatic that states interact with one
another by strengthening their own interests.120
Academics have largely interpreted Grotius as arguing that since scepticism is the
tool that leads to reason, and since reason is the foundation of law ( along with morals),
then it follows that scepticism will form laws. Moreover, integrated in this interpretation
is the notion that scepticism renders men wise and, thus, it is through scepticism that wise
men will formulate laws to preserve the self 121 It can be argued that this very scepticism
is the primary driving force behind interactions between countries. As a result, there is
only a minimal level of trust that, through a desire to protect their own individual
interests, each party on the international scene will honour their part of the bargain.
However, the lack of a stable trust between countries, and the lack of faith that
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institutions can be free from motivations to improve their own interests, prevents the
submission of independent states to overarching binding mechanisms.
Grotian scholars argue that international relations consists of broader elements
than merely conflicts of interest, and that in the dealings of countries there develops an
international society that is similar to domestic societies. Protecting individuals within
borders does not dominate the interests of this international society, nor is this society
specifically concerned with the plight of the less fortunate. Rather, it is largely concerned
with ensuring the territorial sovereignty, safety, and promotion of the interests of each of
the participant states on the global scale. This is done with the understanding that weaker
states can advance their interests in relation to what more powerful states are willing to
negotiate. Rising out of necessity for the maintenance of this international community is
the formation of a set of understandings with respect to certain functions of society. Such
functions include, but are not limited to, diplomatic relations standards, "the exercise of
Great Power Management", regulations to restrict excessive use of force, and the "self-
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For Grotian scholars, conventional regulations, such as unspoken norms and rules,
are accepted as important elements of international relations. 123

This society, as

envisioned by Grotius, contains a series of actors on the international scene who have
certain interests in common and use the preservation of these interests as a basis for
social relations. The maintenance of each of the international members' sovereignty thus
becomes important to international concerns, and the territorial integrity of these
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countries becomes a protected convention at the global level. 124 Consequently, as events
unfolded throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, nations
realized that certain crimes did not recognize borders and only cooperation amongst
countries could help prevent the rise of such shocking transgressions.
Contrasting the Grotian perspective, therefore, the Kantian framework suggests
that there are certain values for basic huma::i rights that are universal and must be
enforced for all the people of this world. This "community responsibility" perspective
pushes the individual to the forefront of international concern, and maintains that the
preservation of basic human rights transcends any notions of territorial concerns. 125 It is
in light of this approach that much of the world is increasingly involving itself in
preventing matters that offend basic moral principles, even if the results do not manifest
themselves immediately.
Respected theorists, such as David Held, expand on Kant's liberal theory of
international relations to improve the components of individual autonomy in an evolving
political environment. The literature for this school suggests that democracy does not
inherently reflect notions of popular sovereignty, 126 claiming that democracy must also
represent the marginalized groups within society.

It is important to provide equal

opportunities for all the inhabitants. 127 Such theorists, led by Held, do not claim that
territorial sovereignty should not exist, but claim that the state has not been able to
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completely ensure the basic rights of all people. 128 As a result, they suggest that there is a
need for certain overlapping mechanism at the international level, that are not territorially
or politically motivated, which would protect the people and help sustain the boundaries
of officially sovereign countries. 129
Much of this liberal Kantian theory is based on changes that took place following
the end of the Cold War.

Though academ1cs agree that the number of democratic

governments may have increased throughout the world, not a great deal has changed for
the individuals that were marginalized prior to democratization. In fact, the focus of
these academics is not just the "formal structure of government, but also the material
changes introduced into the world by transnational processes that go beyond the limited
reach of any particular sovereign state. " 130
One of the critiques made by Kantian liberals regarding the much lauded benefits
of globalization, is that the opening of borders and the spread of democracy have
generated little improvement in relations between states.

What this means is that

countries, most notably the largest democracies, are reluctant to apply the standards of
their "model of governance" to their dealings with one another. As a result, since they do
not adhere to the same liberal tenets when dealing with other nations, they also refuse to
be held accountable for decisions made in foreign affairs or on matters of security. 131
The strongest argument for the Kantian perspective develops in light of the
globalization process in international relations. 132 The opening up of borders and the
advances made in technology have certainly created a smaller world, in that all four
128
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corners of the globe are now accessible to virtually anyone with the means to travel.
Moreover, globalization has in large part created a new 'superpower' entity, that of the
economy. Perhaps the greatest benefit of this globalization trend is that many nations and
individuals have been able to line their pockets with the financial gains made possible by
the virtual removal of borders. In the twenty-first century, most governmental decisions
are guided by economic considerations, maldng this new 'superpower' the decisive
element in government. As a result, Kantians argue that state sovereignty has been
reduced by the inability of governments to make decisions while remaining uninfluenced
by international economic considerations.

Consequently, since state autonomy has

diminished, so too has states' ability to unilaterally promote equality and freedom for
individuals within its borders. 133
Writers adhering to the Cosmopolitan school of thought take the Kantian theory
of "universal society'' a little further, arguing that democracy needs to be redefined.
Since states are incapable of improving the plight of the minorities within their borders,
namely because they cannot rival the power of economic giants, there is a need for
international mechanisms to oversee the rights of these individuals.134 "The essence of
... law, is that morality binds rational beings and can be known, in principle, by the use
of reason." 135 The caveat to this school of thought is that there must be guarantees to
protect the less powerful from institutions primarily orchestrated by nations with the
might to impose their will.
Understanding that in a predominantly anarchic setting, rules may simply not be
enough, requests for accountability soon followed the setting of new standards. The
133
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rationalist explanation for the creation of the International Criminal Court can be viewed
from two different perspectives: firstly, addressing the enforcement problems inherent in
many national courts; and secondly, the high cost associated with the creation of ad hoe
tribunals. 136 Scholars argue that the first perspective has not been a predominant concern
at the global level and, as a result, this view only attempts to explain the reason for not
establishing an international court on the basis of trying individuals in national courts. 137
However, historical trends show that the notion of enforcement was one that the
international community had been unwilling to discuss due to the threat it posed to state
sovereignty. It was only with the broader acceptance of universal standards, and the
benefits of adhering to them, that opened the door to discussions about going one step
further and considering enforcement mechanisms. The second explanation appears to
classify the ICC as a 'solution' to the high "transaction costs of international criminal
justice", premised on the continued existence of ad hoe tribunals as an alternative. 138
In fact, the International Criminal Court addresses a number of problems that
were inherent in past ad hoe tribunals, which were created by the UNSC to respond to
allegations of violations of human rights. 139 The ad hoe tribunals were created to address
specific issues arising from specific event, which means that there is a preconception of
guilt prior to the commencement of the judicial process.

"Human rights and the

application of humanitarian law are neither partisan nor political; taking the politics out
of the ad hoe tribunals is a first and fundamental step to ensuring support for the ICC." 140
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Though these tribunals are aimed at persecuting perpetrators of heinous crimes
against humanity, a noble goal indeed, they have been subjected to significant criticisms.
There are a number of elements inherent in the structure of the ad hoe tribunals that
seriously hinder their successful operation. One obstacle is the amount of funding and
resources required to operationalize a tribunal. Countries showed reluctance to commit
to these tribunals due to the financial demand that would subsequently be placed on them,
which in tum caused significant delays in the investigation process, in the prosecutorial
endeavours and in the building of detention centers. Moreover, the ad hoe tribunals did
not come equipped with the rules of procedure that all domestic courts have implemented
since their inception, thus failing to provide clear guidelines for legal actors by which to
abide. 141

The legal standards governing the proceedings have been an attempted

compromise between civil law and common law. Moreover, the prosecutors and judges
came from both common and civil law backgrounds, and with little experience in
international tribunals - for the obvious reason that it is a relatively new phenomenon.
Since the experiences of neither of these types of law clearly dominate the proceedings,
the legal personnel tend to practice according to their own jurisdictional methods.
Moreover, since the practices inherent under civil and common law are fundamentally
different, there has been a disturbing amount of procedural irregularities during the
prosecution of accused villains. When all aspects of these tribunals are considered, one
can easily surmise that the fairness of the proceedings is compromised to an alarming
degree. 142
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As early as 1948, members of the United Nations General Assembly recognized
the need for an international court, and asked the International Law Commission (ILC) to
consider the prospect of creating a criminal court to deal with violations occurring during
armed conflict. The two major players of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet
Union, disagreed on the definition of "aggression", effectively preventing any further
discussions beyond the continued efforts up to 1954. 143
Efforts reconvened approximately twenty years later.

In 1974, and at

approximately every several years, members of the General Assembly pushed for the
adoption of a definition for the crime of "aggression", and continued to request that the
ILC commence work on the creation of an international Code of Crimes. Beginning in
1992, and every year thereafter, steps were taken towards the creation of an independent
judicial body at the international level - the International Criminal Court. 144

The

significance of this Court, in comparison to the International Court of Justice, is that the
ICC is the first permanent global court that provides a forum in which individuals, rather
than nations, are tried for the perpetration of the most heinous crimes committed against
humanity as recognized under international law. 145 Though there were discussions about
the possibility of including actual states, entire political organizations, or complete
companies into the Statute as potential parties subject to prosecution, the negotiators were
unable to agree to commonly acceptable wording for an Article. 146
As previously mentioned, the International Criminal Court is based on the Rome
Statute Treaty, which was adopted by 120 countries in Rome on July 17, 1998 after a
143
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five-week conference. 147 Currently sitting at The Hague, the ICC was established in
2002, reaching completion one year later with the establishment of its judicial body
comprised of a presidential team, a team of judges, and the office of the prosecutor. This
was an important historical achievement, symbolizing the cooperation of the majority of
the global community on the creation of a body that will hold individuals accountable to
universal standards of human rights and international humanitarian law. 148 That the
Rome Statute incorporates components of civil law and common law demonstrates the
fact that it is the compilation of a wealth of nations, each leaving a unique mark reflecting
the various legal approaches around the world. 149
The Court's skeletal structure has been organized in a manner to embed
independence and impartiality at the core of the organization. The personnel active in the
legal administrative sector, such as the prosecutor and the judges, have all been carefully
selected on the basis of their achievements and the backgrounds they represent. They are
from vastly diverse cultures and have stood out in their particular field of interest,
meaning that they must have years of experience dealing with concepts they will likely
encounter at the International Criminal Court. The basic structure of the Court is divided
into four organs: the Presidency, the Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor, and finally,
·
150
the Reg1stry.

All the members of the Presidency are elected on a full-time basis by a vote of
absolute majority from the Court's 18 judges to serve a mandatory three-year terms that
can be renewed. The Presidency is comprised of the President, as well as the First and
147
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Second Vice-Presidents, and are duty-bound to oversee the proper administration of all
facets of the Court with the exception the Office of the Prosecutor. The latter is intended
to remain a completely independent from any other organ of the Court, and is charged
with the handling of referrals. Moreover, the Office of the Prosecutor is required to
examine all information and documentation alleging crimes, which it will prosecute if the
evidence is substantial. The Registry is to ove!"see the administrative aspects of the Court
that do not fall under the judicial purview, and will not interfere with the powers of the
Prosecutor. 151
The Chambers can be described as akin to the heart of the Court, where all the
judges sit in their various capacities and make precedent setting decisions regarding the
cases presented to them. The judges are elected by and national from States Parties, for
either three, six, or nine year terms; whereby the former may renew their position in
office while the latter cannot, unless where specified by the Rome Statute.

The

subdivisions under the Chambers provide three different stages of hearings, each with a
focus on particular areas of the law. The Pre-Trial Chamber includes the First-Vice
President and 6 other judges who must determine whether the alleged violation falls
under the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute, thereby affirming or denying the
commencement of an investigation. If the Prosecutor's request for the commencement of
an investigation is denied, he/she may at a later date make another request with evidence
of new facts. Additionally, arrest warrants and other summons are issued from this
Chamber at the request of the Prosecutor. When the suspect has been apprehended, it is
before the Pre-trial Chamber that he/she accepts or rejects the charges. 152
151
152
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The Trial Chamber is comprised of, much like the Pre-Trial Chamber, judges wit h
criminal trial backgrounds. The Second-Vice President and five other judges det ermi ne
the

necessary procedures, tailored to each trial, to ensure expediency and fairness for the

protection of the victim's rights as well as those of the accused. The Trial Chamber hears
the proceedings beyond the duties of the Pre-Trial Chamber, and establishes the guilt or
innocence of the al leged offender as well as the sent ence for the crime. Finally, the
Appeals Chamber is the di vision that hears appeals from either the Prosecutor or the
accused, on both procedural and legal errors. This Chamber includes the President, as
well as 4 other judges wit h experi ence in applicable fields of int ernational law,
humanitarian law, and human rights. 153
The International Criminal Court has implemented multifaceted jurisdictional
rules that have come under attack by its critics. In the fist instance, the jurisdiction of the
ICC is complementary in that it can only prosecut e cases where the country that has
jurisdi ction is not capable of providing, or is unwilling to provide, a fair and impartial
t rial.

However, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can also refer cases to the

ICC, as a way of circumventing the requirement that a country be a signatory to the
Rome Statute. 154 Understandably, academics consider this an important shortcoming
because of the concern that certain countries will prefer t o handl e the prosecution
domestically. For example, while the ICC is able to impose sent ences of imprisonment,
it cannot impose the death penalty, which certain nations still allow. However, the ICC
does not require nations that still carry out the death penalty t o refrain from imposing it
when individuals who have committed crimes against humanity are tried in national
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courts. 155 It is predominantly industrialized nations that will prefer to resort to their own
judicial systems, thereby allowing them to cling to their Grotian notions of sovereignty
and state independence.
Since the International Criminal Court is a treaty-based court, it will have
jurisdiction over the countries that have ratified the Statute, known as States Parties, and
only crimes committed after the inception of the Court will be pursued.

156

The caveat to

this rule is that the UN Security Council may refer a case to the ICC, even if the case
involves a country that has not ratified the Statute. Once a decision is made by a nation
that has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute, the ICC will not be able to interfere
with the proceedings. Moreover, if that country decides not to legally pursue the matter
after investigation, the ICC is largely powerless to intervene, and the same rule applies to
cases were the nation holding jurisdiction has claimed to have investigated and
prosecuted the individual already. 157
This raises serious concerns because it is often industrialized nations that have
strong domestic legal systems, and are capable and willing to prosecute alleged
perpetrators. However, these are often the same countries that are heavily involved
militarily in conflicts taking place in lesser-developed nations, usually with the aim of
protecting their own foreign investments and their own national interests. Consequently,
it is the army personnel of the very nations capable of prosecuting that are also involved
with crimes against humanity. Perpetrators of industrialized countries would most likely
be tried in the ICC, as the domestic structure of lesser-developed countries is generally
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not capable of carrying out this judicial function, which would provide a much milder
process. However, their less fortunate counterparts would likely face much harsher
penalties if tried within a wealthy nation.
Scholars argue that these concessions have narrowed the scope of law
significantly, and have created important limitations in the Rome Statute. 158 However, it
must be recognized that these limitations were a 'necessary evil' in that lack of
compromise could have, and probably would have, prevented the creation of the Court all
together.

Since each country has its own legal framework and represent distinct

traditions, each wanted to have their beliefs reflected in the Statute, while at the same
time avoiding becoming entangled in a Treaty that would be contradictory to their
national laws and norms.
A historically important jurisdiction shift implemented within the Rome Statute
was to reduce the ambiguity of crimes for which an individual can be prosecuted.
Importantly, the requirement that a crime would have to occur during armed conflict has
been removed, thus widening the Court's jurisdiction. 159
For the new Court, crimes against humanity are acts
committed in a widespread or systematic way with an
organizational policy against any civilian population, where
the acts are, among other things, murder, enslavement,
deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment
in violation of international law, torture, persecution,
enforced disappearance and the crime of apartheid....
Rather than the terse sentence asserting jurisdiction over
violations of the 'laws and customs of war', we now have
several pages of war crime listed in a way which renders
·
·ri 160
them qmte spec1 1c.
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Critics of the International Criminal Court argue that the articles of the Rome Statut e are
still too vague to accomplish th e goals set out by the global community; but it cannot be
overlooked that "now at least it is written down in a treaty and accessible to everyone ."

161

In order to ratify the Treaty, many countries have to make constitutional or
legislat ive changes to their domestic laws, in order to avoid conflict between domestic
and international law. 162 However, because nations wanted to avoid any

inconsisten ci es

within the Rome Statute, namely since it was the work of many nations, a significant
numb er

of compromises was embedded

in

th e document. In fact, one of the aspects of

the ICC that is creating hesitation amongst certai n nations is the impact of the Rom e
Statute on domestic law, as ratifying nations fulfill their obligation to

ensure

that the

crim es laid out in the Statute can be tried within their own borders. While this is clearly
an indication of Kantian perspectives,

in

that it attempts to universalize certain legal

standards, traditional notions are not entirely lost. As a result, it must be recognized that
legislat ion for the ICC is not retroactive, so it only applies to crimes committed aft er the
court has been created . 163 Scholars argue that this hierarchy of importance significantly
limits the power of the ICC and its ability to remain politically u nmotivated .
Moreover, since the International Criminal Court does not have its own law
enforcem ent body, it must rely on States Parties to comply w ith the provisions of the ICC
in bringing individuals to justice under Article 86 of the Rome Statute . 164 However, the
Statute also provides ways around this requirement, in that States Parties may refuse to
comply w ith the request of the ICC if it might involve matters of national security or if
161
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contravention to domestic laws. 165 Gone are the days of enforcement
through international tribunals; and here is a new era in which properly equipped national
judicial structures are involved in the enforcement process. The significance of this shift
is that individuals have no guarantee that they can seek the protection of their nation
under the umbrella of the sovereign rights of the state. In fact, perpetrators can face
accountability for their crimes in their own court, within their own nations, and in front of
their own people. 166
Scholars argue that state cooperation is tantamount to the efficiency of the Court,
because only the States Parties are empowered with the proper investigatory and
apprehension mechanisms to bring criminals to justice. One view suggests that as a
result of the lack of law enforcement mechanisms, the ICC becomes virtually useless.
The premise for this argument is that, on the one hand, in situations where the state is
willing to cooperate in the apprehension of an individual and ensure adequate law
enforcement, the state is also more than likely capable of conducting the trial
domestically. This, in turn, devalues the presence of the ICC in the prosecution of a
violator. On the other hand, if the state is not willing to cooperate with the ICC's request
for help in the prosecution of an alleged criminal, or even in that individual's extradition,
then that nation has simply undermined the purpose of the Court. In the event of such a
situation occurring, the ICC may find that nation uncooperative and refer the incident to
the UN Security Council, especially if it is a matter specifically referred to the Court by
. .
161
the UNSC or the States Parties m any other case.
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The UNSC's role in the ICC has generated concern among the States Parties that
were involved in this project of Kantian universality, aiming to eradicate the hierarchy
amongst nations. The UNSC is given the right to prevent certain persons from facing
prosecution by resolution, which is renewable every twelve months. Critics of the ICC
argue that the mere fact that the ICC is tied to the United Nations through this clause, and
thus under the influence of the United States, (which holds veto power as a member of
the UN's Permanent Five), weakens the ICC's credibility. 168
Certain scholars argue that the ICC is a separate body from the United Nations,
and this minimal connection should not be taken out of context. Article 16 of the Rome
Statute does not allow members of the Security Council to veto the instigation of any
cases untaken by the ICC, but does allow for those members to veto requests to postpone
a trial for 12 months. Moreover, this must be adopted by a resolution, and thus not
spurred by the interests of a single nation. Since there is a minimum-voting requirement
for the creation of a resolution within the UNSC these actors must vote every year to
maintain a resolution that does not incite public support. It is suggested by scholars, that
it is unlikely that members of the UNSC will want to jeopardize their international
popularity for the sake of postponing a trial that would affect one nation's interests. 169
The notion of state sovereignty is still a guiding principle in international
relations, and a very sensitive issue for many countries, including those in the Middle
East, that have been dealing with foreign control and intervention for many years.
Consequently, Article 72( 1) states in part that, "where the disclosure of the information
or documents of a State would, in the opinion of that State, prejudice its national security
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interests", states are entitled to withhold information. This principle is further reiterated
in Article 93(4). 170 This is based on faith that nations will not hinder investigations with
false claims of violations of national security. Nevertheless, history has shown that state
leaders and administrations are often unmotivated by honesty and good faith, but act on
the economic and power interests of themselves and their nations.
Respected legal writers have noted that restrictions placed on judges in the Rome
Statute are symbolic of the world community's distrust in the ability of the judges to
carry out their legal tasks impartially and free of political pressures. Legal scholars argue
that the restrictions placed on judges, preventing them from creating their own rules of
procedure and evidence, is hindering the natural process of legal development that needs
to occur if the law is aiming to address needs as they arise. 171 An argument employed by
these academics is the examples of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals that provided
judges with the flexibility to create laws as unique situations occurred, and thus address
needs as they present themselves.

However, the judges of the ICC must seek the

approval of the States Parties before adopting any new rules of laws. 172 It should be
noted that many courts have adopted rules and principles developed by the Tribunals, and
the latter have adopted precedents set by domestic courts.

Therefore, as noted by

academics, if the ICC is based on the body of law created by international judges, then it
is counterproductive to adopt a narrow scope for the Rome Statute and prevent further
legal development. 173
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Moreover, other scholars view this perspective from a different and
complimentary light, by arguing that since these judges and the prosecutor were elected
and represent gender and cultural diversity, the rights of all people will be recognized.
Furthermore, the design of the administration was based on the belief that single
individuals would be harder to influence than governments. This means that the most
pivotal players within the ICC will be out of reach of diplomatic bargaining, since they
do not need to be concerned that their decision will impact foreign and/or economic aid
to a country. 174

Government representatives must always bargain in order not to

disappoint their home country, but the judges and the prosecutor are not representing the
needs of one state, therefore, their decisions will be based on the common good of the
international community.
International prosecutions of war crimes have been prevented by the prioritization
of peace over the need for justice; preferring instead to resort to diplomatic relations as a
means of rectifying past actions. Notions of impunity, scholars argue, were at the root of
many of the cruelties that took place during WWII, resulting in the international
community ultimately addressing the increasing need for personal responsibility for
11s
.
cnmes
agamst
.
.
humamty
. and/or war cnmes.

Nonetheless, many scholars were

sceptical of the success of establishing universal mechanisms to ensure that violations of
international law were not left unaccounted for, and suggested that it may pose a
hindrance to maintaining peace.
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The International Criminal Tribunals of the former Yugoslavia (1993) and
Rwanda (1994) helped expand the range of international law to an even greater extent. 176
The ad hoe tribunals for both countries have proven that personal accountability in
international matters are now being met with a certain amount of global success,
notwithstanding the exorbitant costs and slow progress, without contributing to the rise of
related violence. 177 Moreover, it reflects the fact that the international community is not
blind to the positive effects of creating this kind of international accountability, in the
hope that it will act as a deterrent to future violations of international law. However, so
many different countries also embody unique customs and legal standards, thus requiring
them to overcome significant ideological obstacles in order to agree on one interpretation.
Writers and theorists tend to agree that the message being conveyed by the
inception of the International Criminal Court to be that: no one is above the law and
everyone is accountable for his or her actions, regardless of status.
The development of individual accountability for
violations of human rights and humanitarian law, in
terms of both codification and enforcement, is one of
the most significant changes in contemporary world
· 178
po 1.1tics.
Many countries do not have the mechanisms in place to bring such perpetrators to justice
in their own national courts, so the ICC provides a forum for those countries to prosecute
heinous crimes committed during armed conflict.
Some of the central features of the International Criminal Court exemplify the
precarious balance between contemporary universal aims and traditional realist notions of
global relations. However, these features outline the importance given to the protection
176
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of individuals, even at the expense of eradicating certain safeguards previously attainable
merely through territorial protection. For centuries, global actors have been making
decisions with the conscious notion that sovereign borders provide immunity from
accountability for actions, even with respect to other states. The Rome Statute does not
specifically address "domestic amnesties" since this topic generated significant
ideological conflict amongst the states participating in the drafting of the document.
However, prominent scholars, such as Ruth Wedgwood, contend that the lack of
reference to this concept must be seen in a positive light, as it presents more leeway for
prosecutors so they can make the right decisions to address specific cases as they arise. 179
The jurisdiction of the Court does not extend beyond crimes that occur within the
nations of the State Parties, which prevents a universal application of the principles
enumerated in the Rome Statute. Some scholars suggest that this will discredit the ICC,
since it will be unable to bring certain violators to justice. It is academically accepted
that states that have not ratified the Rome Treaty, and that have taken a strong stance
against the creation of the Court, fear politically motivated actions against their
citizens. 180 These exemplify traditional realist points of view, namely that states must
protect their territorial sovereignty. However, the shortcomings of this perspective do not
consider that a large number of nations have ratified the Treaty and given the general air
of Kantian universality in the global arena, there is likely to be increased pressure for the
transparent prosecution of serious legal transgressions.
While it is understandable that, on the surface, these Articles seem to deliver a
blow to the legitimacy of the ICC, it must be recognized that, in a global society where
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standards of conduct have been codified, international pressure is likely to be an effective
tool of influence.

In light of the Kantian perspective taking hold of international

relations, it will be highly improbable that serious transgressions of law will be left
unaccounted for, especially if the majority of nations are subjected to the same standards.
The criticisms levelled at the Rome Statute paint the Court in an ineffective light because
its structure is relatively weaker than domestic courts in developed countries. However,
it is important to acknowledge the Court's accomplishments, especially since it was
created by the mutual agreement of a majority of countries throughout the world, and its
aim is to protect individuals from matters that were previously considered domestic. The
limitations placed on the ICC's jurisdiction and the inclusion of the right for the UNSC to
refer cases stems from a compromise to appease concerns of infringement of sovereignty
and influence. Nations wanted to ensure that their rights as individual countries were still
respected, while the US wanted to make sure that it would have, at least, some controlling
measures on the ICC - such as through its powers on the UNSC. Most importantly, the
Court is raising certain elements of human security to greater heights by establishing a
permanent institution capable of accessing individuals previously out of reach of the
global community. If security is to be defined as the absence of threat, then the ICC
should theoretically be a means to achieving such an end through deterrence.
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As a

result, it would be counterproductive to consider the ICC as a failure due to its limited
rights; but it must be viewed as a success in light of the notion of accountability and
respect for humanity that it represents.
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Chapter Four: US Opposition to ICC

The creation of overarching institutions, such as the International Criminal Court,
automatically reduces the autonomy of participating states in order to give such
organizations a certain degree of power.

Nevertheless, the effect of the ICC on

diminishing sovereignty, even minimally, has spurred actions by its greatest opponent,
the US, that have been globally criticized. 182 Regardless of the lack of support from the
United States, the ICC continues to remain one of the most significant international
achievements in history, especially as the theoretical shift away from a purely realist
perspective of security studies is becoming increasingly evident. Cooperation amongst
countries, to promote the needs of their citizens and structure their societies in a manner
that will provide as much stability as possible, is an endeavour that has been gaining
momentum. Human rights and the respect of human dignity have been gaining increased
attention worldwide, and many changes have already been implemented. Human security
has become a field of study and a goal for many academics and political actors. As such,
it is important to recognize how far the global community has come since the end of the
Second World War. Weaker nations abhor the concept of foreign influence that attempts
to discredit their history and culture, which is the reason behind much of their animosity
towards traditionally powerful states. However, many of them would welcome help in
penalizing the perpetrators within their nations, instead of subjecting the entire population
to demands by countries with the power to impose their will. Though much of the world
had reconciled sovereignty with the need of the citizenry, especially in light of the
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inception of the European Union (EU); the United States remains dedicated to its
isolationist stance, wanting to cling to their status as world leader for as long as possible.
The global community recognized the benefits of cooperation for the creation of
the first International Criminal Court, formed independently of any nation or global
organization. The United States maintains that their dedication to the universal values
that bind nations together has not weakened, but that its objections to the ICC derive from
its own endeavours to protect American values and the personnel that conduct missions
on its behalf The position adopted by the United States is further proof that while the
world is moving forward, towards a universal standard, the world's leading hegemon is
choosing to preserve increasingly isolationist policies. Its support is restricted to the
development of democratic states, meaning that an international society is merely a
"society of states", whereby America can still maintain power through the international
institutions that grant it greater discretion, such as the United Nations Security Council. 183
Consequently, American objections to the ICC are based on four principle arguments:
1. The Rome Statute does not provide a check against the powers of the prosecutor;
2. The ICC's jurisdiction extends beyond the countries that have ratified the Statute,
to include non-signatories, which is a threat to American sovereignty;
3. Prosecution may be politically motivated; and,
4. The ICC weakens the UNSC's role of protecting international peace and security.
Initially, however, the US participated in the drafting of the Rome Statute, and
even signed it, showing some support for the Court under former President William
Clinton's administration. Nevertheless, as presidential power changed hands, that same
administration suggested that it would be beneficial for George W. Bush's incoming
government to carefully consider ratification and, if possible, to avoid it. As a result, the
US quickly revoked its signature, concerned with the implications of the Court for the
183
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personnel involved in international missions abroad. 184 This became of notable and
significant concern following the most recent war in Iraq, presumably due to the scandals
that erupted at Abu Gharib prison regarding the dehumanizing treatment and torture of
prisoners by American military personnel. Particularly, the United States was a strong
opponent to the amount of discretion given to the prosecutor during the drafting of the
Rome Statute, and the country remains fairly sceptical. It preferred to give greater regard
to the interests of the state, which is a realist approach, rather than foreign countries. 185
The ICC, nevertheless, enjoys the approval of a vast number of states, as 120
countries voted in its favour and only seven against it, with 21 abstentions.

It is

interesting to note, however, that countries with policies that the US publicly condemns,
including Iran and Cuba, seem to parallel America's opinions on the ICC. 186 In fact,
controversy surrounds the notion that the US does not accept the limited jurisdiction
imposed by the ICC, but rather imposes its will on other nations even when this may not
be legitimate. As remarked by a former trade negotiator from the European Union, the
American administration "will enforce its rights but not necessarily respect its
obligations." 187
Thus, the United States passed the American Service Members Protection Act
(ASPA) which prohibits the United States from cooperating with the ICC, and has
obtained signatures from at least 35 of the ICC's signatories. 188 The Bilateral Immunity
Agreements (BIA), also known as the Article 98 Agreements, are treaties stating that
184

Ibid, 200-202.
Brubacher, 73.
186
Nancy Guffey-Landers, "Establishing an International Criminal Court: Will It Do Justice?" The
Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade 20 (1996): 204.
187
Ibid.
188
"US Bilateral Immunity Agreements or So-Called "Article 98" Agreements," Coalition for the
International Criminal Court [article online]; accessed on 5 July 2006; available from www.iccnow.org.
185

73

nationals of the United States, and the states operating under the purview of this Act,
agree to extradite individuals accused of violating humanitarian law to their country of
nationality, not to the ICC. Furthermore, this Agreement is based on Article 98(2) of the
Rome Statute, which states that,
the Court may not proceed with a request for
surrender which would require the requested State to
act inconsistently with its obligations under
international agreements pursuant to which the
consent of a sending State is required to surrender a
person of that State to the Court, unless the court can
first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for
the giving of consent for the surrender. 189
Although many countries were reluctant to commit to such an agreement, the United
States employed cunning coercive measures, such as threatening to withdraw aid, as a
means of obtaining the signature and commitment of these states. Latin America was
threatened with withdrawal of funding for its war on drugs, the Balkans faced cuts to
military aid, and so on. Needless to say, these funds amount to millions of dollars, and to
have this financial aid revoked can significantly devastate the recipient. As a result,
many countries were forced to sign the BIAs. 190 The American administration took
advantage of a provision that was meant to clarify a conflict of interest in cases where the
country being asked to extradite an individual had already committed itself to previous
agreements with other nations regarding such situations. 191
As of April 2006, the non-government organization ICC Now has documented
that, of the 100 States Parties to the International Criminal Court, 54 have publicly
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declared their refusal to sign the Bilateral Immunity Agreements, bringing the total
number of refusals to 56. Of these, 18 States Parties have suffered significant financial
loss from the withdrawal of funding previously provided by the United States.192 The aid
that the American administration provides throughout the world addresses a variety of
issues pertaining to the welfare of the citizens of those countries, often related to matters
of stability. For example, Brazil lost $500,000, Ecuador and South Africa each lost $7.6
million, Tanzania $230,000, Peru $2.4 million, and Croatia lost $800,000 in funding. 193
The political repercussions of these economic pressures can be multilayered, as they
prevent countries from achieving the goals they have set for themselves. This revocation
is especially harmful when the funding is used to address issues of fundamental
importance to countries, such as the control of drug trafficking, education about AIDS,
peace promoting programs, and so on. 194 The unavailability of funding can thus lead to
destabilization throughout the region, as the 'spill over' of problems can flow easily
through porous borders. Yet, although much of this funding aids developing countries
battle issues unique to them, many have opted to relinquish this help rather than submit
their morals and beliefs to a cause they view as unjust. Nevertheless, since significant
monetary values are at issue, these nations should be commended for adhering to the
security of the world instead of economic motivations.
In response to American fears of the ICC being used as a political tool of
retribution, those who support the endeavours of the Court suggest that the checks and
balances implemented in the Rome Statute are sufficient to provide the necessary
192
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safeguards from any possible risks.

It was during the Clinton administration that

negotiations were taking place to draft the Statute, and the main concern in the White
House was that the ICC would "constrain America's freedom of action abroad."

195

In

order to prevent such obstacles, Washington played a key role in shaping the statute.
In explaining the initial support of the US for the ICC, it is important to note that,
in its preliminary stages, the Court was meant to be under the purview of the Security
Council and governed by the United Nations Charter. Essentially, it was going to be a
permanent version of the ad hoe tribunals that the United States has been involved in
creating since World War II. 196 However, during negotiations for the Rome Statute,
many countries strongly objected to the ICC falling under the control of the Security
Council because they wanted this Court to be independent of political influence. The
caucus of like-minded states were very vocal in their position that political actors, such as
state leaders, should not be capable of influencing the Court; otherwise its credibility is
put in jeopardy of being severely undermined. 197 Thus, since it was decided that the
Security Council would not govern the ICC, the Court was removed from control by
states and transformed into an entirely new and independent body that had been absent
from the international arena.
The role of the United Nations Security Council in the ICC, specifically argued
for by the US, has since generated a great deal of concern. To ensure that American
military personnel would not be tried for violations of international law, the UNSC
pressed to obtain the right to prevent certain persons from facing prosecution. A number
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of countries opposed allowing the UN Security Council to interfere with the Court, since
the ICC is independent and not affiliated with any political body.

The compromise

reached on this issue was that a deferral of the trial would be granted, for a renewable
period of twelve months, with a resolution from the UNSC.

198

Although the US

campaigned to have these twelve months automatically renewed at the end of its term,
States Parties resisted, arguing that this provi�ion would be a direct contradiction to the
very essence and character of the Court. 199 Additionally, UNSC members are prohibited
from vetoing any cases undertaken by the ICC, but the Rome Statute does allow Security
Council members to veto a request to postpone trial. 200
As a result, it is unfortunate that the United States has chosen to distance itself
from the International Criminal Court since the checks and balances ingrained in the
Rome Statute should appease those concerns continually raised by the American
administration. It is clear that the refusal to submit to the ICC stems from political
considerations, as the United States is desperately clinging to its status as the world's
hegemon and thus often considers itself above those laws that apply globally. History
has certainly shown that empires do not last indefinitely, and it is beneficial to stay
within the sphere of current global movements.
The political repercussion of such a staunch American opposition is already
becoming evident as it affects certain US diplomatic relations. The United States and
European countries have, for the most part, been close allies in the international arena for
decades. While this relationship did not deter any amount of authority attributed to
America following the Cold War, the formation and enlargement of the European Union
198
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has become a new globally imposing presence. As the EU garners strength and solidifies
its policies, it shifts increasingly away from America's approach to international
relations.201
Presently, the battle between the US and the EU stems beyond a mmor
disagreement that can be pushed aside as a matter of opinion. This is most visible in the
fact that the EU unanimously approved the International Criminal Court, while the US
adamantly opposed it.202 Although the US had grown accustomed to being able to
influence the international position of its European friends in order to pursue its own
interests, the EU is now a consolidated bloc of countries integrated on a level far deeper
than simply economics.203 This is therefore making it nearly impossible for the US to
exert its authority on Europe. Part of the reason for the EU's comparable strength to that
of the US is that
it has a larger population than the United States, a larger
percentage of world trade, and approximately equal gross
domestic product... It pays a larger percentage of the U.N. 's
core budget (37 percent versus the United States' 22 percent)
and a much larger percentage of the U.N.'s funds and special
program costs (50 percent versus the United State's 17
percent). On a per capita or per-GDP basis, every one of its
member countries contributes more to development
assistance than does the United States.204
In fact, the EU has explicitly acted in contravention to an increasing number of
requests and expectations of the United States, much to the latter's consternation. One of
the changes that the EU is experiencing falls under the influence of the German and
Dutch positions regarding the environment. Over the past ten years, lobby groups and
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NGO involvement has risen in the EU, most notably within the European Parliament,
which corresponds to the European public's increased attention towards certain issues.

205

Interestingly, and often contrary to international support, the unilateral approach that the
United States has often engaged in, has resulted in the EU further solidifying itself as a
single unit. This is readily seen in the EU's support of the Kyoto Protocol in the face of
explicit American rejection, and EU's involvement with North Korea despite strong US
objection and historical tension. 206
Tension between the US and the EU are also impacting other states and
prospective relations with the United States; primarily due to the fact that most nations
have affiliations with the US but are torn between which opposing side of the policies to
support. France has even warned prospective EU applicant and member-states that their
decision, for or against the US, if made poorly, will impact the EU' s decision regarding
their applications. While this may seem like sheer manipulation, it is important for
future EU members to understand the depth of their involvement with the Union,
especially since every member is committed to follow the regulations set forth in the
Treaty on the European Union. Article 11 of this Treaty states that members of the EU
are understood to provide support, based on the "spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity",
for all of the EU's foreign and security policies. Members states are expected to act in
accordance with the interests of the EU, and in not in opposition to it, or there will
ultimately develop severe negative ramifications for the unity of the organization. 207
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It is clear that the US does not want to be held to the same standards as those that
apply to the rest of the world. Accordingly, this has not escaped the attention of the
European Union, which strongly contests the US campaign forcing countries to sign the
BIAs. Deeply offended with the tactics used by the Americans to gain signatories for
these Agreements, the EU warned that its members should not accede to US wishes as
America continues to undermine the ICC, in which the EU is an active participant. 208
Subsequent to the EU's message to member states regarding its stance on the
BIAs, the Bush administration sent letters to individual EU member-states imploring
them to disregard the request of the Union. The US went so far as to threaten to alter its
role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) if countries did not sign the
Agreements. Moreover, the Bush administration told prospective NATO candidates that
any refusal to sign the Bilateral Immunity Agreements would adversely affect their
consideration for entry into the organization. 209 By 2003, the US had effectively cut
military aid to 35 countries, six of which were potential EU member states that had
followed the EU's policy pertaining to the ICC. 210
Despite Washington's intense stance against the International Criminal Court,
recent events in world politics have caused, some suggest, a minor shift in US policy
towards the passive acceptance of the authority of the Court. Sudan has been in the
midst of severe internal conflict, most notably in the Darfur region, whereby an alarming
number of residents are being displaced on a daily basis. Throughout this conflict, the
perpetrations of egregious crimes against humanity were being conducted at an
astronomical rate, creating a stir of concern within the international community. After a
208
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number of investigations into the allegations of human rights abuses, the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur - a group sponsored by the United States - created a

complete report on the situation. In January 2005, the Commission indicated that the
judicial system and authorities in Sudan were neither capable of nor willing to render
those individuals responsible for perpetrating the atrocities accountable. They further
emphasised in the report a strong recommendltion that the case against the responsible
individuals in the Sudanese government and the army it allegedly supports, the
Janjaweed, be referred to the International Criminal Court with urgency. 211 It is at this
juncture that the United States was forced to sway from its strong and very active stance
against the ICC. When UN Security Council Resolution 1593 was presented before the
assembly of states, thereby referring the Darfur case to the ICC, the United States
desisted from using its veto power. Such an event, scholars suggest, represents an initial
acceptance by the American administration towards the relevance of the ICC in the
global community, and has since prompted a few remarks by politicians acknowledging
the potential of an international justice mechanism. 212
However, the question remains as to whether the United States would have acted
similarly had one of their strong allies been the subject of such referral by the UNSC to
the ICC. The United States most likely did not relax its opposition to the ICC, but
merely deemed the Sudan case of little consequence to its foreign policy endeavours.
Had an American ally been subjected to the UNSC for potential reference, the United
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States would most probably have blocked it and launched a campaign to prevent further
discussion on the matter.
Those who support the policy adopted by the United States towards the
International Criminal Court explain that the actions of the government are in line with
protectionist measures and are reasonable. The first claim is that much of the burden of
the peacekeeping and stabilization of Sudan. when the conflict slackens, will fall on the
United States. As such, proponents of American policy suggest that the abstention from
Resolution 1593 merely acknowledges that the global community would benefit from
cooperation; it must not be viewed as a weakening of US opposition to the ICC. They
maintain that the Rome Statute is still lacking safeguards in certain areas, and adhering to
the belief that the US is very wise in protecting itself from potential backlash. 213
It has been since the Cold War that the United States has imposed its will in the
international arena without being held accountable for its actions. As a result, it is
difficult for the American administration to support a new force that has the ability to
stand up to the US. What makes this an additional humiliation for Washington is that the
very institution that is rejecting America's political endeavours used to abide by many
American requests.
Though the implications of the American opposition to the International Criminal
Court have not yet fully manifested themselves, it likely that they will come to light with
greater involvement of the Court in international relations. The fact remains that many
countries have chosen to reconcile their differences, and have reached negotiated
compromises in order to minimize any impediments to the creation of the Court. This
John R. Crook, "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law," The
American Journal of International Law 99, no. 3 (2005): 692.
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movement does not necessarily signify a shift towards world peace; but merely suggests
the recognition by most leaders that the enemy is a mysterious and powerful entity, which
is no longer easily identified and can come equipped with significantly destructive
capabilities. There is an increase in the willingness of many countries to unite, regardless
of alliances, ideologies, and political identities because of the recognition that they all
share a common goal. Hostilities, conflicts and open warfare is the type of enemy that
states are accustomed to dealing with; but a group of civilians with a message and an
impressive amount of arsenal, threatening to resurface anywhere and at any time, is a
relatively new phenomenon.
It is worth mentioning that the positive achievements throughout the past several
decades that have aided and perpetrated by the advancement of technology, have also
facilitated the task of violent individuals and ill-wishing government members.
Accessibility to all areas of the world is no longer a feat when in possession of the means
to travel, meaning that all nations can potentially fall prey to the destructive
consequences of violence. As such, state leaders are leaning towards a system of unity in
attempting to deter the perpetration of crimes that transcend borders. To this end, they
have opted to vest their faiths in a universal mechanism that can promise the most
efficient and independent methods for the prosecution of criminal activities under its
jurisdiction.
In fact, the aggressive campaign launched by the American administration will
inevitably increase the distrust of many nations towards the United States; while
potentially undermining the Court, since it does not have the support of the leading
superpower. Its actions are inconsistent with the messages that American leaders seem to
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propagate through the media: that international norms should be respected and
cooperation to achieve a similar end is encouraged.

However, the United States

administration, under President George W. Bush, only requires cooperation for efforts
undertaken and supervised by the US but will not partake in measures over which it is not
in full control.

The US has discredited itself, and proven to the world that its

commitment to human security will only prevail when there is a clear benefit to gain
from the endeavour, but not when the benefit is mutual universally. Certainly, this fact
became glaringly obvious when the Bush administration had to strong-arm states in order
to get the BIAs signed. America's lack of involvement will likely cause little harm to the
functioning of the Court, but will make the funding and law enforcement aspects a little
more difficult of organize. The United States is in one of the best positions to provide
both man-power and capital to ensure that the ICC has the resources necessary to work
and conduct its job efficiently. However, it will not do so unless it is given considerable
reins to control the organization, but the difficulties presented by that lack of funding are
not so insurmountable as to warrant stripping the Court of its independence.
Scholars suggest that the United States is choosing to be isolationist as a matter of
policy, stemming from their perception of themselves as being superior to other nations.
As such, the American administration reserves itself the right to dictate expected
behaviour to others, while they are free to conduct their affairs according to their own
rules. Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, the United States preferred the route of
'systematic unilateralism', instead of 'institutionalized multilateralism'. Yet, following
the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon it has subverted to complete
isolationist measures. As a result, the United States has had considerable difficulties
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adapting itself to institutions that are neither heavily dependent upon nor influenced by
American power. 214 A significant number of countries throughout the world, however,
seem to be adjusting to this shift away from realist perspectives in international relations
towards the creation of a greater global community.
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Conclusion

Since the general atmosphere of the global community reflects the nature of
states, the evolution of security studies is an excellent tool to determine that international
relations has progressed from the traditional expectations of interaction. Whereas in the
past it was the sovereignty of the state that was the defining feature of relations, and the
basis upon which institutions were set up, than the creation of the International Criminal
Court is quite telling.

Logic can only conclude that the global community has

recognized the need for an enforceable mechanism of accountability, created by the
member states that are willing participants in the hopes of structuring future behaviour in
a manner deemed acceptable. That this reflects the general opinion of the majority of the
world's state leaders is evident in the amount of participants and signatories to the Court.
However, it is also important to note that such an accomplishment would have been
impossible under the old tenets of security studies, prioritizing sovereignty and state
supremacy above the welfare of its citizenry.
The shift in security perspectives is increasingly putting value on humankind and
the basic necessities for existence of humanity. The 'business of war' has developed
significantly over the centuries, and more so since the early days of the twentieth century.
Military attacks are no longer largely concerned with other soldiers, but target civilians
and many aspects of civilian life.

Moreover, technological advances have provided

deadlier weapons and easier means of attaining them, which are often more rampant
throughout developing countries. It is as a result of these changes, and many others, that
human security is being threatened to a much larger degree, thus requiring the immediate
attention of the global community.
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This change from traditional notion of realism towards universalist perspectives is
creating certain tensions on the international scene, as it requires the cooperation of states
beyond the usual diplomatic, political, and economic concerns. Political actors, a title no
longer relegated to governments and heads of states, must combine their individual
interests with that of the global community in order to address problems that plague all
four comers of the world. The progress of human rights and the codification of laws to
protect the sanctity of humanity has been a long and arduous one, which requires
continuous work if it ever hopes to address all the concerns expressed by the global
community. Nonetheless, the developments to date are admirable in that they have
forced many political leaders to acknowledge issues that were previously ignored or
treated as inconsequential. The fact that human security has become a field of study and
has attained governmental attention is an important feat, namely in that its recognition is
a symbol of the emancipation of international tenets. The creation of the International
Criminal Court is an important step in this direction because it codifies and legitimizes
the values attributed to human security and highlights the vitality of basic human rights.
The study of international relations is an intricate network of many interdependent
concepts and fields that continue to influence and shape each other in the global
community. It is impossible to separate domestic concerns from international ones, legal
concerns from political ones, and human rights from human security. If the ICC had not
enjoyed the support of the majority of the world, American opposition could have
severely hindered its success and credibility. However, just as many nations have refused
to sign the bilateral immunity agreements at the expense of significant foreign aid, the
world will continue on the path of honouring the sanctity of human life above - or on an
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equal scale with - economic and political gains. One can only hope that a century from
now, human security will be deeply ingrained in the international community as a
testament to the universal standards that hold humanity in high regards. Consequently,
the success of the ICC cannot be undermined on the basis of the shortcomings in the
Rome Statute, nor should it be compromised by American resistance. The theoretical
meaning and symbolism that it represents in the global community is a tribute to its
success as one of the first truly independent accountable bodies at the international level.
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